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1N 
early two decades ago, Arabs 
who volunteered to aid the anti-
Soviet struggle in Afghanistan 
dispersed from the conflict 
zone to pursue their newfound passion: 
jihad in the path of God. Known as “Arab 
Afghans,” these veterans participated 
in national insurgencies and civil wars, 
facilitated international terrorism and 
became ideologues of global jihad.1 Today, 
Iraq’s global jihadists are facing a similar 
moment. Al-Qa`ida in Iraq (AQI) is under 
tremendous military pressure from Sunni 
tribes, nationalist insurgents and U.S.-
Iraqi counter-insurgency operations. 
There is a distinct possibility that AQI 
could be driven out of Iraq in the near 
future. It is unclear, however, what the 
movement will do next. The experiences 
of Arab Afghans suggest that the defeat of 
1  The term “Arab Afghans” was initially used by some 
Arab governments—especially Egypt and Algeria—in 
the early 1990s as a derogatory reference to individuals 
who were seen as “troublemakers” or religious zealots 
who donned Afghan-style clothing.
AQI may generate new threats associated 
with the dispersal of its fighters in the 
region and around the world. Therefore, 
it is vitally important to revisit the 
experiences of the Arab Afghans to 
develop lessons for present day Iraq. 
The Arab Afghans
Arab Afghans were a tiny contingent in 
the anti-Soviet struggle, or “a drop in the 
ocean” according to one former prominent 
Arab volunteer.2 Generous estimates put 
the number of Arab volunteers in the 
Afghan conflict at 3,000 to 4,000 at any 
one time, especially after 1986.3 In total, 
2  Abdullah Anas, The Birth of the Arab Afghans: The Auto-
biography of Abdullah Anas between Masoud and Abdullah 
Azzam (Arabic) (London: Dar Al Saqi, 2002), p. 87.  
3  According to Steve Coll, “The CIA’s Islamabad station 
estimated in a 1989 cable to Langley that there were prob-
ably about four thousand Arab volunteers in Afghani-
stan, mainly organized under [Abdul Rasul] Sayyaf’s 
leadership.” Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of 
the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Inva-
sion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 
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2approximately 10,000 Arabs served in 
the area.4 Most volunteers were based 
in Peshawar and other Pakistani cities 
bordering Afghanistan. They included 
humanitarian aid workers, cooks, drivers, 
accountants, teachers, doctors, engineers 
and religious preachers. They built 
camps, dug and treated water wells, and 
attended to the sick and wounded.5 Arab 
volunteers with jihad as a goal mostly 
came in the late 1980s.
Yet, despite their marginal military 
role in the anti-Soviet campaign, Arab 
Afghans acquired many of the elements 
necessary for sustained violent activism. 
A substantial number of volunteers 
participated in military training camps 
established by the Pakistani intelligence 
services and run by commanders of 
mujahidin factions. These camps gave 
Arab Afghans skills in guerrilla warfare 
and terrorism.6 In addition, many of the 
Arab Afghans were socialized in takfiri 
ideologies (which declare as apostate 
secular regimes in the Muslim world). 
Vigilant security services to prevent 
zealots from distributing the works 
of radical ideologues did not exist, and 
governments were unable to counter 
the takfiris with their own breed of 
establishment Islam.7 No less important 
were the network ties that were forged 
between diverse factions and nationalities. 
These networks became important 
for moving jihadists from one conflict 
zone to another, and they facilitated 
the acquisition of money and forged 
2005), p. 201.
4  Peter Bergen, The Osama bin Laden I Know: An Oral His-
tory of al Qaeda’s Leader (Washington, D.C.: Free Press, 
2006).
5 Muhammad Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years: The 
Journey of Afghan Arabs from Everywhere to Wash-
ington and New York” (Arabic), al-Hayat, October 17-21, 
2001, part 2 of 5.
6  Coll, Ghost Wars, p. 144.
7  Khalid Sharaf al-Din, “Fundamentalists’ Leaders Bo-
gus Organizations to Confuse the Security Organs” (Ara-
bic), March 7, 1999, part 2 of 3.
passports.8 Most critically, the Arab 
Afghans experience produced capable 
leaders, religious ideologues and military 
commanders who would play vital roles 
in places such as Algeria, Egypt, Bosnia 
and Chechnya. 
The Dispersion of Arab Afghans
The year 1992 was perhaps the most 
important for the dispersion of Arab 
Afghans. The Soviets left Afghanistan in 
1989 and the Afghan communist regime 
fell in 1992. Many of the Gulf volunteers 
went back home and were treated as 
heroes. Other Arab Afghans became assets 
of regimes and their security services. 
This was especially the case in Yemen, 
where the returning Arab Afghans were 
given a haven and were deployed against 
the socialist establishment of the former 
South Yemen.9
Those who did not reintegrate or serve 
as assets of governments embarked on a 
militant path. Four archetypes emerged:  
1. Facilitators of Jihad. Many Arab Afghans 
saw their role as facilitators of jihadist 
movements in their home countries or 
around the world. Facilitation included 
training, financing and sheltering jihadists 
in Pakistani camps and guest houses. It also 
encompassed smuggling weapons, forging 
travel documents, printing propaganda 
materials and serving as communication 
liaisons between clandestine individuals. 
Facilitators also produced ideological 
and theological justifications for militant 
groups. These facilitators were mainly 
in Peshawar, but they also emerged in 
Europe (London in particular), Yemen, 
Sudan and Afghanistan after the rise of 
the Taliban.
2. National Islamic Revolutionaries. Some Arab 
Afghans, particularly those from Algeria 
and Egypt, saw an opportunity in the early 
1990s to overthrow their own regimes. 
Although the Algerian and Egyptian 
veterans did not initiate the insurgency 
in their respective countries, their skills, 
networks and experience helped the 
8  Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Phila-
delphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); 
Quoted in Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years,” part 4 of 5.
9  International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Coping with Ter-
rorism and Violence in a Fragile State,” January 8, 2003; 
Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affili-
ate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror (Washington, 
D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2004). 
insurgent movements tremendously.10
3. Global Jihadists. A number of Arab 
Afghans took their training, experience 
and networks to other conflict zones, 
especially Bosnia and, later, Chechnya. 
Their aim was to aid fellow co-religionists 
in their own struggles for secession or 
liberation. Roaming jihadists used a 
variety of means to enter conflict zones. 
The most common was illegal infiltration 
with the help of professional smugglers 
or through bribing local officials and 
border security agents. Others posed as 
humanitarian activists, relief workers, 
or journalists seeking to cover a war 
zone. Some relied on fake passports, even 
diplomatic ones, acquired through forgers 
in Pakistan or Europe.
4. Unaffiliated Terrorists. Less common 
were the volunteers who carried out 
successful and foiled terrorist attacks 
in the name of Islamic causes either in 
their home countries or in the West. An 
exemplar of this pattern is Ramzi Yousef, 
the mastermind behind the 1993 World 
Trade Center attack. In 1990, he went 
to Afghanistan to train in the Khaldin 
camp, run by Arab volunteers. He trained 
for about six months, learning weapons 
tactics, basic explosives and military 
maneuvers. He graduated to a more 
advanced course in remote-controlled 
bomb-making and experimented with 
some explosives in Afghanistan’s civil 
war. He used his connections in Peshawar 
to acquire an Iraqi passport, which he 
used to enter the United States.11
Comparing Arab Afghans with Foreign 
Fighters in Iraq
Although Arab Afghans were a relatively 
small group that had little influence on 
the course of events in Afghanistan, they 
10  Mohammed Muqadem, “The Journey of the Algerian 
Afghans from the [Armed Islamic] Group to the Al Qae-
da Organization” (Arabic), al-Hayat, November 25, 2001, 
parts 1-7; Salah, “Events of the Jihad Years,” part 3 of 5.
11  Coll, Ghost Wars, pp. 248-49 and p. 278.
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“Foreign fighters in Iraq 
are more threatening 
than their Arab Afghan 
predecessors in several 
respects.”
“Those who did not 
reintegrate or serve as 
assets of governments 
embarked on a militant 
path.”
3were able to carry out terrorist attacks 
around the world, start new national and 
transnational terrorist cells, aid several 
insurgent movements, build camps 
to train future generations of radical 
Islamists and launch a surprise attack 
on the only remaining superpower in 
the world. These considerations do not 
bode well for the dispersal of jihadists 
from Iraq. Foreign fighters in Iraq are 
more threatening than their Arab Afghan 
predecessors in several respects.
Exposure to Combat
Foreign fighters in Iraq have been 
exposed to intense combat since the 
Iraqi insurgency escalated. Unlike 
Arab Afghans who fought less on 
the battlefield, the foreign fighters in 
Iraq engaged coalition forces in direct 
combat, carried out car bombs and 
suicide attacks, deployed a range of 
improvised explosive devices and rockets, 
conducted kidnappings and beheadings, 
shot down aircraft, engaged in complex 
attacks against hardened targets and 
assassinations of high-value personnel, 
and intimidated the Iraqi government, 
the majority Shi`a population, and, more 
recently, Sunni insurgents and tribes that 
oppose them.12
Networking
Jihadists in Iraq are connected to 
experienced trainers, gun runners, human 
smugglers, guns-for-hire, criminals, 
forgers and other radical Islamist 
groups. AQI has transformed its largely 
foreign membership into an Iraqi one 
through cooptation and money. Deposed 
Ba`athists that cannot be integrated in 
the new Iraqi order may find a home in 
the global jihadist movement as guns-
for-hire or facilitators of jihad. Although 
the Afghan mujahidin did not join al-
Qa`ida’s global movement in the 1990s, 
this may have been a practical problem of 
language. Iraq’s Ba`athists speak Arabic 
and can mix with the Arab-dominated 
global jihadist movement. This was not 
the case with the Afghan mujahidin.
Enhanced Communications Environment
The proliferation of internet-
based technologies facilitates the 
communication needs of dispersing 
jihadists and facilitates their movement. 
The internet enables them to maintain 
12 Michael Knights and Brooke Neumann, “A New 
Afghanistan? Exploring the Iraqi Jihadist Training 
Ground,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 1, 2006. 
communication with their networks in 
Iraq with relative ease, reach out to other 
jihadist groups for guidance on how to 
enter other conflict zones, and access 
their training manuals without having 
to carry them across borders. Dispersing 
terrorists will likely mine the internet 
for practical information on visas, travel 
regulations and routes to take.
Despite the clear advantages available 
to Iraq’s foreign fighters over their Arab 
Afghan predecessors, three factors could 
mitigate their threat potential in the 
future. 
First, foreign fighters are the main supply 
of suicide bombers in Iraq, which means 
they will not be around to threaten other 
states.13 
Second, neighboring states are not likely 
to offer fleeing jihadists an inviting safe 
haven akin to the one Pakistan offered 
Arab Afghans in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The Arab Afghans were able to move 
between Pakistan and Afghanistan with 
relative ease, settling in Peshawar’s many 
guest houses and training camps without 
fear of harassment or arrest. Iraq’s 
dispersing jihadists will not have such a 
haven to exploit. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Turkey are aligned with the 
United States and have been targets of 
radical Islamists. Therefore, they have 
no incentives to shelter fleeing jihadists. 
Syria and Iran might choose to provide a 
safe haven for fleeing militants, but they 
will do so discretely to avoid incurring 
further hostility or military action from 
the United States. Jihadists that go to Iran 
and Syria will not be able to set up camps 
like the ones that developed in Pakistan 
during the 1980s or under the Taliban in 
the late 1990s. 
13 Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The 
Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (Washington, D.C.: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2007); Richard A. Op-
pel, Jr., “Foreign Fighters in Iraq Are Tied to Allies of 
U.S.,” New York Times, November 22, 2007. 
Absence of an inviting safe haven next to 
Iraq means that dispersing jihadists will 
have to cross multiple borders and acquire 
documentation to enter distant havens. 
This, in turn, increases their vulnerability 
to detection and arrest. Many foreign 
fighters in Iraq have to turn over their 
cell phones, money and passports to 
smugglers or the insurgent groups that 
host them.14 If they choose to leave, they 
will have to acquire money and forged 
documents to cross multiple borders to 
make it back to their homelands or new 
destinations. 
Finally, dispersing jihadists will encounter 
vigilant Arab and European governments 
that are aware of their potential threat. 
During the Afghan campaign, Arab and 
European governments took in returning 
volunteers because they were aided by some 
of these governments to fight the Soviet 
Union. Volunteering for Iraq, in contrast, 
is considered a criminal act by most of 
these governments. Returnees from Iraq 
will encounter arrests, interrogation and 
possibly surveillance to make sure they 
are not a threat. European governments 
are not likely to welcome jihadists in their 
territory as they did Arab Afghans during 
the 1990s. These governments are on the 
lookout for jihadists seeking to destabilize 
their countries or take advantage of their 
territories.
Conclusion: Policies for Countering the Threat 
of Dispersing Jihadists
The experiences of Arab Afghans suggest 
several lessons for containing the potential 
threat coming out of Iraq. 
Lesson 1—Conflicts Attract Jihadists
Many Arab Afghans went to where the 
action was located—Bosnia, Chechnya, 
Algeria and Egypt. Jihadists who wish 
to leave Iraq in the near future are 
likely to seek other conflict zones, such 
as Afghanistan, Pakistan and Somalia, 
where they are likely to be welcomed 
by fellow militants in need of support. 
Foreign fighters might also seek to join 
insurgent Islamist groups in North Africa, 
especially in Algeria. 
14  Qasim Hamadi, “Detailed Information on 600 Al Qae-
da Fighters in Documents Captured by American Forces 
in Al-Anbar” (Arabic), al-Hayat, January 13, 2008; Karen 
DeYoung, “Papers Paint New Portrait of Iraq’s Foreign 
Insurgents,” Washington Post, January 21, 2008.
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4Lesson 2—Jihadists Exploit Safe Havens
Dispersing Arab Afghans exploited safe 
havens and governmental support in 
Pakistan, Sudan and Yemen. All three 
countries had populations sympathetic 
to jihadism, were relatively weak states 
and harbored political calculations that 
involved exploiting militants for national 
or regional interests. Therefore, countries 
and communities with populations 
sympathetic to jihadism and governments 
unwilling or unable to deny a haven 
to jihadists are at risk of attracting 
dispersing foreign fighters in the near 
future. Pakistan’s tribal regions, where 
radicals have been receiving shelter since 
the 1980s and where al-Qa`ida’s core 
leaders are believed to be currently based, 
is the most likely destination of fleeing 
jihadists. Another possible destination 
is Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon 
because those camps are policed by 
Palestinian factions, not the Lebanese 
government. 
Lesson 3—Networking is the Key to Success  
Arab Afghans during the 1990s benefited 
from the network ties that developed 
during the anti-Soviet campaign. It took 
network links to enter into new conflict 
zones, finance training camps and acquire 
forged documents to move from country to 
country. Facilitators of jihad in Pakistan, 
Europe and Sudan were the backbone of 
the emerging al-Qa`ida global network 
and the key to its high-profile operations. 
Foreign fighters in Iraq have succeeded 
in forging new network ties with former 
Ba`athists and Sunni insurgents. 
Therefore, dispersing jihadists are likely 
to exploit these networks to exit from Iraq 
or build connections between facilitators 
inside Iraq and terrorist cells outside the 
country. 
Governments concerned about the threat 
of dispersing jihadists can pursue a 
number of measures:
- Prioritize the problem by making 
programs that track the movement and 
dispersion of jihadists a top intelligence 
priority. Counter-terrorism departments 
must dedicate resources and personnel to 
monitor dispersion from Iraq and track 
its development over time. They must also 
develop databases on terrorism incidents 
with links to Iraq-based groups to look for 
patterns in network facilitation, methods 
and tactics.
- Treat emerging conflicts where local 
Muslim actors are involved, weak states and 
ungoverned regions as potential magnets 
for dispersing jihadists. Collaborate with 
allied intelligence services to anticipate 
the influx of militants into these areas 
and develop information on smuggling 
networks and routes that may facilitate 
the transfer of dispersing jihadists. Routes 
to Afghanistan and Pakistan’s Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas should be a 
top priority because al-Qa`ida is likely 
sheltered there and has strong support 
structures in both countries.
- Provide allied intelligence agencies 
the names of Iraqi and foreign detainees 
in U.S. detention facilities in Iraq. 
These individuals should be flagged for 
additional scrutiny at border entry points. 
Immigration agencies should also have 
access to the names of former detainees 
and known foreign fighters in Iraq in case 
they apply for asylum as Iraqi refugees.  
- Assist states to improve the quality of 
their passports and update their border 
control technologies to make it difficult 
for individuals to enter their territories 
with falsified documents.
- Engage in a robust diplomacy to dissuade 
governments from offering unofficial 
safe havens to fleeing militants. Impose 
sanctions and threaten the assets of sub-
state actors and political parties that 
shelter returning jihadists for militant 
purposes (especially in Yemen and 
Pakistan).
- Develop extradition treaties and 
repatriation protocols to facilitate 
the handover of apprehended foreign 
fighters and fleeing jihadists. European 
governments in the past refused to 
extradite individuals to countries 
with dismal human rights records and 
capital punishment. Therefore, it might 
be advantageous to encourage Arab 
governments to provide assurances 
that extradited militants will not face 
extrajudicial punishments or death 
sentences in order to facilitate their 
repatriation from Europe. 
- Explore offering amnesty and 
reintegration programs to repentant 
foreign fighters seeking to exit the path 
of jihad. Those who return and provide 
information on their networks could 
be given immunity from prosecution 
or reduced sentences to be served in 
rehabilitation centers similar to the Saudi 
model.15
These measures comprise a 
comprehensive strategy to counter the 
threat of dispersing jihadists. They make 
the process of dispersion more difficult, 
expose militants to the risk of being 
apprehended at borders, deprive them of 
support networks and new safe havens, 
facilitate their repatriation to their home 
governments and encourage them to exit 
the path of jihad through rehabilitation 
and reintegration. 
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15 Christopher Boucek, “Extremist Reeducation and 
Rehabilitation in Saudi Arabia,” Terrorism Monitor 5:16 
(2007).
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5Combating Terrorist 
Financing at the Agency 
and Interagency Levels
By Dennis M. lormel
the united states responded immediately 
and decisively to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001. Terrorist financing 
was, and continues to be, an integral 
element of the counter-terrorism strategy. 
A core requirement for a successful 
terrorist organization is funding. 
Disrupting the flow of funds between the 
source and distribution points diminishes 
the ability for these groups to succeed. 
This was one of the most important 
lessons learned following the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks.
In the aftermath of 9/11, terrorist financing 
became a significant focus in the U.S. 
government’s war on terrorism and had 
to be dealt with on both the agency and 
interagency levels. Each agency having a 
nexus to terrorism had to establish entities 
and internal mechanisms to deal with 
terrorist financing. The methodologies 
developed and implemented needed to be 
innovative and inclusive. The interagency 
had to develop a meaningful and effective 
mechanism for initiative prioritization, 
coordination, cooperation and information 
sharing. Today, combating terrorist 
financing has become an important tool in 
the U.S. government’s counter-terrorism 
arsenal. 
Where We Have Been
The interagency formed an informal 
Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) for 
Terrorist Financing in late 2001, and it was 
formalized under the National Security 
Counsel (NSC) in 2002. All agencies with 
a nexus to terrorist financing participated 
in the PCC. The PCC identified the 
highest terrorist financing targets and 
developed strategies to deal with them. 
The primary focus of the PCC was on 
State and Treasury Department led 
designation and sanctioning actions 
that were supported by information 
provided by all participating agencies. 
The Department of Justice (DoJ) played 
a prominent role in this process.  
The PCC evolved into the 
Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) 
on Terrorist Financing. The CSG, like the 
PCC, is a coordinating group that has no 
authority over the participating agencies. 
The 9/11 Commission determined that 
the PCC was generally successful in 
marshalling interagency resources to 
address terrorist financing following 
9/11.1 Interestingly, the government has 
come under periodic criticism for not 
having one agency, entity or individual 
with authority over all agencies engaged 
in terrorist financing activities.2 During 
at least the 2002-2004 period, a sub-
group from the PCC involving the NSC, 
Treasury, CIA, FBI and State met on 
a weekly basis to discuss criminal and 
intelligence investigations or operations 
and to continuously prioritize interagency 
targets.3 The priority financial targets 
identified by this group were primarily 
investigated by the CIA and FBI in 
conjunction with each other. Led by the 
NSC, State and Treasury, this group 
also developed a strategy to deal with 
getting Saudi Arabia engaged in terrorist 
financing issues.  
  
At the agency level, the 9/11 Commission 
further determined that the post-9/11 
interagency response was focused and 
driven by a sense of urgency concerning 
terrorist financing.4 The PCC succeeded in 
coordinating and prioritizing interagency 
activities to include diplomatic actions, 
sanctions and designations, and 
intelligence and criminal investigations. 
In great part as a result of this coordinated 
effort, the 9/11 Commission Report Card 
1  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
United States, “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” 
Staff Report to the 9/11 Commission, p. 8, available at 
www.9-11commission.gov.
2  Major Wesley J.L. Anderson, “Disrupting Threat Fi-
nances: Utilization of Financial Information to Disrupt 
Terrorist Organizations in the Twenty-First Century,” 
Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leaven-
worth, April 2007, p. 56. 
3  Ron Suskind, The One Percent Doctrine (New York: Si-
mon and Schuster, 2006), p. 144.
4  9/11 Commission, “Monograph on Terrorist Financ-
ing,” p. 7.
graded the government A- for its efforts in 
terrorist financing. This was the highest 
grade given the government.5
Immediately following 9/11, both the 
CIA and FBI took steps to coordinate 
more effectively on combating terrorist 
financing. The CIA established the 
Financial Operations Group (FINO), while 
the FBI created the Terrorist Financing 
Operations Section (TFOS). Within a 
week, FINO and TFOS established a joint 
working relationship. As the relationship 
grew and with the passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, each entity assigned 
personnel to the other’s operation and 
initiated an unparalleled information 
sharing mechanism. FINO and TFOS 
developed proactive strategic and tactical 
methodologies and initiatives. In addition, 
TFOS conducted historic or traditional 
financial investigations involving 
the review and analysis of financial 
records. The key was the development 
and implementation of time sensitive 
mechanisms. 
For the first time, financial intelligence 
and the transactional flow through the 
financial system were used for strategic, 
tactical and historic purposes. Strategic 
financial intelligence was collected 
and used for analytical purposes to 
identify emerging trends and establish 
proactive strategic financial investigative 
methodologies. Financial information 
was used from a tactical perspective to 
engage in proactive financial investigative 
initiatives. From the intelligence and 
law enforcement standpoints, this was 
extremely productive. Treasury, FINO 
and TFOS participated together in a 
highly classified and successful operation 
tracking the flow of financial information. 
TFOS provided transactional information 
to an allied government in a near real 
time capacity that prevented at least 
four terrorist attacks in that country.6 
Financial information was used by 
TFOS, the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS), Customs Service and other law 
enforcement agencies to build historical 
or traditional reactive investigations 
requiring the comprehensive review of 
financial books and records. 
5  9/11 Commission, “Report Card,” 2005.
6  Testimony of FBI Deputy Assistant Director John S. 
Pistole before the House Committee on Financial Ser-
vices Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, 
September 24, 2003.
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“For the first time, financial 
intelligence and the 
transactional flow through 
the financial system were 
used for strategic, tactical 
and historic purposes.”
6Between 2002 and 2004, Treasury 
agencies—including the Office of Foreign 
Assets Control, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network, IRS, Customs 
Service and U.S. Secret Service—focused 
significantly on terrorist financing. In 
2004, Treasury established the Office 
of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence 
to bring all of its assets together more 
effectively and to play a leadership role 
in battling terrorist financing.7 This 
included financial and policy analysis, 
enforcement and investigations.
DoD’s Role in Countering Terrorist Financing
Prior to 2004, the Department of Defense 
(DoD) had a limited role in terrorist 
financing and only participated passively 
in the PCC. It did not have initiatives 
or operations specifically focused on 
terrorist financing. Nevertheless, DoD 
intelligence components did support the 
FBI, CIA and other law enforcement and 
intelligence terrorist financing operations. 
For example, when Iraq was invaded, 
FBI agents were selectively embedded 
with military intelligence to collect 
information on al-Qa`ida. This included 
agents from TFOS, who coordinated 
forwarding financial intelligence to TFOS 
for analysis. Subsequently, TFOS and 
IRS agents were deployed to Iraq and 
worked with DoD conducting financial 
investigations and intelligence collection. 
In addition, TFOS deployed teams of 
agents on a rotating basis to Guantanamo 
Bay to identify detainees believed to be 
knowledgeable about terrorist financing. 
With DoD support, TFOS conducted 
numerous interviews and developed 
useful lead information.    
In August 2004, CENTCOM established 
the Threat Finance Exploitation Unit 
(TFEU).8 The TFEU had small groups in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. They went beyond 
terrorist financing and identified the 
underlying problem more broadly in the 
context of threat finance. DoD considered 
the problem two-fold. There was terrorist 
financing, and in the broader context 
there was threat financing, which 
included weapons of mass destruction 
funding, narco-trafficking, organized 
7  Testimony of Undersecretary Stuart Levey before the 
House Financial Services Committee, August 23, 2004.
8  Lieutenant-Colonel Darryle J. Grimes, “The Financial 
War on Terrorism, Grading U.S. Strategy for Combating 
the Financing of Terrorism,” National Defense Univer-
sity, April 15, 2006, p. 54.
crime and human trafficking.9 The 
primary focus of the TFEU in Iraq was 
on the insurgency, while in Afghanistan 
the top priority was narco-trafficking. 
In developing the operational concept, 
DoD sought to capitalize on its military 
resources in theater. By capitalizing on 
these resources, the TFEU has functioned 
as a valuable financial intelligence 
collection mechanism. This tool can be 
used to identify and destroy enemy threat 
targets. It also serves as a mechanism to 
share information with the interagency. 
Treasury has played a very active role 
in working with the TFEU, and DoD 
considers Treasury the lead agency in this 
area.10
 
There have been a variety of media reports 
concerning threat finance successes in 
Iraq.11 The evolution of threat finance 
within DoD began at the grassroots level 
and progressed at a slow pace. The U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM) 
has responsibility for leading the DoD 
global war on terrorism. By 2006, all 
geographic commands were putting 
together threat finance cells. In addition, 
SOCOM dedicated resources to work 
in conjunction and coordinate with the 
interagency community in Washington. 
DoD is perfectly positioned with its global 
presence, reach and resources to more fully 
engage in threat finance and the collection 
of financial intelligence in support of its 
9  Ibid., p. 50.
10 Testimony of Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Special Operations and Combating Terror-
ism James Q. Roberts before the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats 
and Capabilities and the House Financial Services Sub-
committee on Oversight and Investigations, July 28, 
2005.
11 Andrew Cochran, “U.S. ‘Iraq Threat Finance Cell’ 
Puncturing Insurgents’ Financial Network,” Counter-
terrorism Blog, November 20, 2007, available at www.
counterterrorismblog.org.
military objectives and the interagency 
terrorist financing mission. Thus far, DoD 
has failed to maximize its threat finance 
capabilities and has not established a 
policy for the same.12 DoD is, however, 
engaged in a number of productive 
initiatives with the interagency. 
Treasury, for example, continues to work 
closely with the TFEU in Iraq. DoJ has 
begun a targeted initiative with the TFEU 
in Iraq, and DoD has assigned an officer 
to coordinate this project at DoJ. DoD and 
the FBI are working in conjunction with 
each other on a number of cases.
The interagency strategy between 2001 
and 2003 was to use the full weight of 
government powers to combat terrorist 
financing. This included coordinated 
diplomatic actions, designation and 
sanctions, law enforcement and 
intelligence investigations. As the 9/11 
Commission Report Card reflects, this was 
a success. An important element, however, 
was missing: military action. Since 
2004, DoD has played an increasingly 
important role in the government-wide 
terrorist and threat financing initiative. 
Adding military action to the arsenal of 
diplomacy, sanctions, law enforcement 
and intelligence provides the government 
with its most robust terrorist and threat 
financing capability.                              
Where We Should Go
The interagency community must 
continue to evolve both at the agency and 
interagency levels. The challenge is that 
the enemy is cunning, as terrorist groups 
are learning organizations.13 They are 
adept at avoiding detection and exploiting 
financial systemic vulnerabilities. 
Methodologies must continue to be 
developed, implemented and enhanced 
that disrupt and minimize the flow of 
terrorist and threat finance. One means to 
achieve this is the collection of financial 
intelligence that can be strategically 
applied to identify emerging trends. This 
trend analysis would be beneficial in 
the development and implementation of 
tactical operations. This is particularly 
important for military and law 
enforcement operations.
12  Anderson, “Disrupting Threat Finances: Utilization 
of Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organiza-
tions in the Twenty-First Century,” p. 63.
13  James JF Forest, Teaching Terror: Strategic and Tactical 
Learning in the Terrorist World (Lanham, MD: Rowman 
and Littlefield Publishers, 2006), chpts. 1-3.
MARCH 2008 . Vol 1 . issue 4
“Since 2004, DoD has 
played an increasingly 
important role in the 
government-wide terrorist 
and threat financing 
initiative.”
7The most significant areas of vulnerability 
or weakness to terrorists and terrorist 
organizations are communications and 
finances. These areas consistently lead 
to the disruption and dismantlement of 
terrorist groups and activities. Although 
terrorists consistently change their 
methods of operations and demonstrate 
adaptability at avoiding detection, they 
must communicate and raise and spend 
money to function. Government strategies 
should focus on the disruption of funding 
flows. The optimal situation would be 
to trace terrorist funds back to the point 
of origin and forward to the terrorist 
strike team or cell. This would enable the 
government to take action to disrupt and 
dismantle the identified funding stream 
through intelligence, investigative, 
Treasury enforcement, and/or military 
action. 
To accomplish this, investigators must 
identify three funding tracks. First, 
identify funding flows between a terrorist 
network or organization and the point 
of origin. Second, identify funding flows 
from the network or organization to fund 
operations, including organizational 
operations and specific terrorist activities. 
Third, identify funding flows from 
operations to individuals, cells or groups.
Collecting financial intelligence 
information and conducting analysis 
to identify emerging trends should be 
utilized in developing strategic and tactical 
strategies at the agency and interagency 
levels. Agencies must then balance 
agency priorities with the priorities of 
the interagency CSG as part of the overall 
government counter-terrorism mission.
Training is the one area where the 
interagency has been inadequate. 
Training models should be developed 
and implemented at the agency and 
interagency levels. There should be a broad 
awareness overview for most agency 
personnel about the terrorist or threat 
financing function and responsibilities 
of the agency. Comprehensive training 
is needed for personnel assigned or 
interested in assignment in terrorist 
or threat finance. This training should 
include legal instruction to ensure 
personnel are cognizant of legal 
parameters and sessions on dealing with 
the financial and business sectors. The 
training should provide an overview of 
the jurisdiction and responsibilities of 
other agencies having a nexus to terrorist 
or threat finance. Many individuals 
in one agency do not understand the 
capabilities or responsibilities of other 
agencies. These sessions should contain 
workshops addressing interagency issues 
and impediments to sharing information 
or working together.
Overall, the interagency has consistently 
done a good job in dealing with terrorist 
and threat finance. Nevertheless, it 
must conduct regular self-assessments 
to enhance its capabilities. It must be 
vigilant in identifying emerging trends 
and continue to develop innovative 
techniques. The interagency must ensure 
there is a consistent level of coordination, 
cooperation and information sharing. 
In so doing, there is a better expectation 
that U.S. national security will be 
safeguarded.
Dennis Lormel retired from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation following more 
than 30 years of government service, almost 
28 years as a Special Agent in the FBI. 
During his distinguished career, Mr. Lormel 
amassed extensive major case experience 
as a street agent, supervisor and senior 
executive, particularly in complex, document 
and labor intensive financial related 
investigative matters. Immediately following 
the terrorist attacks of September 2001, 
Mr. Lormel formulated, established and 
directed the FBI’s comprehensive terrorist 
financing initiative. Mr. Lormel currently 
serves as Senior Vice President, Anti-Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing, with the 
corporate security consulting firm Corporate 
Risk International. Mr. Lormel provides 
consulting services and training related to 
terrorist financing, money laundering, fraud 
and financial crimes. 
Lessons Learned from the 
September 2007 German 
Terrorist Plot
By petter Nesser
identifying clear trends in jihadism in 
Europe has proved difficult.1 A jihadist 
terrorist plot in Germany in the fall of 
2007, in which German converts to Islam 
played key roles, testifies to the increasing 
complexity and amorphous nature of 
the jihadist threat. The case illustrates 
that, more often than not, the distinction 
between “homegrown” and “international” 
jihadism in the European context is vague 
in terms of organizational affiliation and 
motivational landscape. Another lesson 
learned is that despite alternative sources 
of recruitment, radicalization and training 
for jihadist networks on the internet, 
Europe’s mujahidin still value and seek out 
real life training and personal interaction 
with organized groups and experienced 
fighters abroad.2 From a counter-terrorism 
perspective, the case shows that Western 
security services have increased and 
improved international cooperation and 
their capacities to deal with the changing 
realities of transnational jihadism.
A Conspiracy to Kill Americans
On September 4, 2007, German police 
arrested three terrorist suspects in 
Oberschlehdorn, Westphalia for allegedly 
planning and preparing three powerful 
car bomb attacks against U.S. interests 
and citizens in Germany. The core of the 
cell consisted of two German converts 
to Islam and one Turkish immigrant. 
They were in contact with, and received 
training, support and instructions from, 
a Pakistan-based Uzbek jihadist group 
called the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU).
The suspects had gathered large quantities 
of chemicals and military detonators. 
They discussed several targets, including 
Frankfurt International Airport and the 
U.S. Ramstein military airbase, as well 
as a restaurant/discothèque frequented 
by Americans. At the time of the arrests, 
they were in the process of manufacturing 
explosives (based on internet recipes) in 
1   Lorenzo Vidino, “Current Trends in Jihadi Networks 
in Europe,” Terrorism Monitor 5:20 (2007).
2  For an analysis of the training practices of Europe’s 
mujahidin, see Petter Nesser, “How Did Europe’s Gobal 
Jihadis Obtain Training for Their Militant Causes?” Ter-
rorism and Political Violence 20:2 (2008).
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8a cabin in Sauerland, Westphalia. The 
chemical hydrogen peroxide was to be 
the main component of the explosive. A 
similar chemical was used by the London 
bombers and by a number of al-Qa`ida-
affiliated terrorists worldwide. The 
suspects had gathered what amounted to 
more than 700 kilograms of the substance, 
loaded into 12 barrels. The chemical had 
a concentration of 35%, and theoretically 
it could have created an explosive force 
equivalent to 500 kilograms of TNT. The 
detonators, believed to have originated 
from Syrian stocks, were smuggled into 
Germany from Turkey by a German-
Tunisian teenager, sewn into a pair of 
sneakers.3 
The anti-terrorism operation, dubbed 
“Alberich,” was launched in October 
2006 when the U.S. National Security 
Agency and the CIA informed 
German counterparts about internet 
communications between IJU in 
Pakistan and the suspects in Germany. 
Altogether, 45 individuals were put 
under surveillance during the operation.4 
The terrorist suspects knew that they 
were being monitored, and implemented 
several counter-surveillance strategies, 
such as coding their communications. 
Nevertheless, while protecting their 
communications, they also took actions that 
seemed irrational, or at least hazardous, 
given that they knew they were being 
watched. For example, the leader of the 
group, Fritz Gelowicz, gave an interview 
to the German media complaining about 
being persecuted by the authorities for no 
3  Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, “Aladin’s Sto-
ries,” Spiegel Online, October 8, 2007.
4  Simone Kaiser, Marcel Rosenbach and Holger Stark, 
“Operation Alberich, How the CIA Helped Germany Foil 
Terror Plot,” Spiegel Online, September 10, 2007.
reason.5 In another incident, one suspect 
shadowed by German agents walked up 
to the agents’ vehicle and stabbed one of 
the front tires with his pocketknife.6 On 
New Year’s Eve 2006, Gelowicz and his 
accomplices drove a car back and forth 
near a U.S. military barracks in the town 
of Hanau; confronted by evidence, they 
claimed that they wanted to see “how the 
Americans celebrate New Year’s Eve.”7 
The Terrorist Profile
The core of the alleged terrorist cell 
consisted of three individuals: two 
Germans and one Turkish immigrant. 
They have been named in the international 
press as Fritz Gelowicz (28-years-old), 
Daniel Schneider (21-years-old) and 
Adem Yilmaz (28-years-old). Gelowicz 
studied engineering; Yilmaz survived on 
odd jobs; and Schneider was unemployed 
after having served in the military. 
The jihadist carrying the unlikely name 
“Fritz,” characterized as the leader of the 
terrorist cell, was born in Munich and 
grew up in the southern German city of 
Ulm. By German standards, he hails from 
an ordinary middle class family. His father 
is an engineer, running a firm developing 
solar energy technology, and his mother 
is a medical doctor. His parents divorced 
when Fritz was a teenager. Former 
schoolmates say the divorce was a hard 
blow for the teenager, and some suggest 
that he turned to religion as a way of 
dealing with disappointment. His brother 
also converted to Islam, but, according to 
German authorities, he has never been 
involved with extremism.8 
Gelowicz enrolled to study engineering 
at Ulm University, where he became a 
member of an extremist Islamic study 
circle. During regular meetings at 
“Cafe Istanbul,” members of the group 
legitimized the killing of Christians, Jews 
and infidels. Gelowicz also became part of 
the “extremist scene” at the Multikultur 
Haus in Neu-Ulm. He befriended Yehia 
Yousif, a medical doctor, who acted as 
a charismatic imam, leader and fiery 
Islamist activist within this community. 
5 Martin Knobbe, “Terrorverdächtiger Fritz Gelowicz; 
Interview Mit Einem Gefährder,” Stern, September 13, 
2007.
6  Holger Stark, “Suspect in German Bomb Plot Tells His 
Story,” Spiegel Online, November 15, 2007.
7 Kaiser, Rosenbach and Stark, “Operation Alberich, 
How the CIA Helped Germany Foil Terror Plot.” 
8  Ibid. 
Under the influence of Yousif, 
Multikultur Haus became a magnet 
for Islamists from all over Germany. 
After German authorities launched an 
investigation into the activities of the 
preacher, Yousif fled the country.9
Gelowicz lost interest in his studies 
and became increasingly absorbed into 
extreme and militant Islamism. During 
the winter of 2003-2004, he took some 
exams and achieved varying results, after 
which he took a leave of absence from 
the university, which would last for 18 
months. During this period, he enrolled 
in Arabic language courses in Egypt and 
Syria and undertook religious studies 
in Saudi Arabia. He also undertook the 
hajj to Mecca during this time, together 
with the two other main suspects of the 
terrorist conspiracy. According to U.S. 
intelligence, in March 2006 Gelowicz and 
his two closest accomplices spent time in 
a training camp belonging to the IJU in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas.10
Motivations and Connections to the IJU
Gelowicz and his associates were driven 
mainly by fierce anti-Americanism 
nurtured by contacts and interaction with 
extremists inside Germany, Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan. Their radicalization appears 
to have accelerated after the 2003 invasion 
of Iraq.11 Several incidents illustrate their 
strong hatred toward Americans. German 
agents, for example, observed one of the 
suspects and his friends trying to provoke 
fistfights outside a nightclub frequented 
by U.S. soldiers stationed in Darmstadt. 
When they failed to provoke any response, 
they slit the tires of American-made cars 
in the area. In a bugged conversation in 
a car, the suspects discussed potential 
terrorist attacks that only included U.S. 
targets. They talked about attacking 
airports and U.S. military barracks, and a 
disco with “American whores.” 
9  Nicholas Kulish and Souad Mekhennet, “In Plot Sus-
pect, Germany Sees Familiar Face,” New York Times, Sep-
tember 7, 2007.
10  Several militant groups linked to al-Qa`ida and the 
Taliban run training activities in the area. Members of 
high-profile British-Pakistani terrorist cells operating 
in Europe are believed to have obtained training in Wa-
ziristan and the North-West Frontier Province; see, for 
example, Kulish and Mekhennet, “In Plot Suspect, Ger-
many Sees Familiar Face.” 
11   Some sources suggest that the terrorists also wanted to 
strike Uzbek representations in Germany; see, for exam-
ple, Cerwyn Moore, “Uzbek Terror Networks: Germany, 
Jamoat and the IJU,” Terrorism Monitor 5:21 (2007).
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“Gelowicz and his 
associates were driven 
mainly by fierce anti-
Americanism nurtured by 
contacts and interaction 
with extremists inside 
Germany, Saudi Arabia 
and Pakistan.”
9Gelowicz and his cell received support 
from the IJU. The IJU was established 
in 2002 as a militant offshoot from the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), 
allegedly with support from al-Qa`ida.12 
The original aim of the group was to 
fight against “infidels” in Uzbekistan, 
implying the regime of Islam Karimov. 
Soon, and probably as a consequence 
of its association with global jihadist 
networks, the group also started to 
focus on international targets inside 
Uzbekistan. In 2004, members of the 
IJU executed terrorist attacks against 
U.S. and Israeli representations in 
Tashkent. In recent years, the IJU has 
recruited fighters outside Uzbekistan 
(predominately Europeans and North 
Africans) offering training in Mir Ali, 
Waziristan.13 The group’s leader, Abu 
Yahya Muhammad Fatih, has claimed 
that the IJU is multinational, consisting of 
“believers from all over the world.”14 In an 
April 2007 statement, the IJU leadership 
announced that the group would step up 
attacks internationally.15 
Contacts among the German cell and the 
IJU appear to have been frequent, direct 
and enduring. The organization trained 
the activists, supplied them with bomb-
making manuals and gave instructions on 
the timing of the attacks.16 The IJU claimed 
responsibility for the attempted operation 
in Germany in a communiqué posted on a 
Turkish language web forum.17
12  The group’s leader said that “many brothers” con-
tributed with “financial, moral, scientific and opera-
tional” support, but without specifying whether or not 
the “brothers” included al-Qa`ida members; see “A Chat 
with the Commander of Islamic Jihad Union Ebu Yahya 
Muhammed Fatih,” Sehadet Vakti, May 31, 2007.
13 Dirk Laabs and Sebastian Rotella, “Terrorists in 
Training Head to Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 
14, 2007.
14  “A Chat with the Commander of Islamic Jihad Union 
Ebu Yahya Muhammed Fatih.”
15  Moore, “Uzbek Terror Networks: Germany, Jamoat 
and the IJU.”
16  Members of the organization communicated with the 
cell in Germany via phone and internet, and they con-
tributed with bomb manuals that showed how hydrogen 
peroxide of low concentration (35% in this case) could be 
“enriched” using flour. The suspects had purchased large 
quantities of flour and stored it in the cabin in Sauerland. 
For more information, see Kaiser, Rosenbach and Stark, 
“Operation Alberich, How the CIA Helped Germany Foil 
Terror Plot.”
17  Yassin Musharbash and Matthias Gebauer, “Islamic 
Jihad Union Threatens Attacks Outside Germany,” Spie-
gel Online, September 12, 2007.
The IJU Cell: Between Homegrown and 
International Jihadism
It is difficult to situate the German cell 
within past and current patterns of 
jihadism in Europe. On the one hand, 
cell members could be considered 
“homegrown” because they were German 
citizens who became radicalized within 
Germany’s jihadist communities. On the 
other hand, the activists connected with 
an Uzbek organization in Pakistan that 
trained them and exerted a significant 
level of control over their activities. In 
terms of motivation, focus on American 
targets and other signs of fierce anti-
Americanism suggest that the activists 
emphasized the international or global 
dimension of jihadism (such as the U.S. 
military presence in the Muslim world, 
whether it was U.S. support for Karimov’s 
regime in Uzbekistan, or military 
operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan). 
There has never been a clear distinction, 
however, between international and 
“homegrown” jihadism in Europe. When 
the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) terrorized 
France in the mid-1990s, they recruited 
from disaffected Maghreb immigrants 
in French suburbs. The GIA mobilized 
around French interference in Algerian 
affairs, but also exploited growing 
frustrations among immigrants who 
found themselves stuck at the bottom of 
French society. When al-Qa`ida started 
to utilize Europe as an arena for attacks 
on U.S. interests around the turn of the 
millennium, the organization’s recruiters 
also targeted frustrated immigrant 
youths, whom they cultured and trained 
in paramilitary camps in Kandahar, Khost 
and Jalalabad. 
In general, Europe’s “homegrown” 
terrorist cells have differed from cells 
controlled by the GIA and al-Qa`ida. 
The cells have been more “European” in 
terms of their sociology and motivations 
(cell members were second generation 
immigrants and converts, and, relatively 
speaking, were more concerned with local 
European policies affecting Muslims). 
Yet, while there are examples that 
jihadist terrorists justified operations 
in Europe with reference to European 
immigration policies (The Hofstad Group 
in the Netherlands) and the mocking 
of the Prophet Muhammad (the Danish 
caricatures), the global dimension, 
and especially European military 
contributions in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
always appeared to be the most important 
motivational driver.
An important distinguishing feature of 
“homegrown” cells is that they involved 
“bottom-up” patterns of recruitment, in 
the sense that the activists themselves—
inspired and radicalized by militant 
preachers and audio-visual propaganda—
took the initiative to link up with organized 




The German case seems to be consistent 
with “bottom-up” processes of recruitment 
to a certain extent, but at the same time 
it involved a strong element of command 
and control by an organized global 
jihadist group. This aspect of the case 
might indicate that jihadist organizations 
based in the Muslim world have regained 
capabilities to run operations inside 
Europe “hands on.”
Another lesson learned from the Gelowicz 
affair is that despite possibilities for 
recruitment, radicalization and training 
via the increasingly sophisticated jihadist 
“internet infrastructure,” personal, face-
to-face interaction between recruits 
and experienced activists still plays 
an important role in radicalization 
processes.18 Even though the activists had 
the opportunity to download a “terrorist 
start kit” from the internet, they still 
took the risk of mingling with Germany’s 
jihadist crowd and international networks 
in the period leading up to the alleged time 
18  When the internet started to be used widely, Islamist 
activists established a substantial “infrastructure” on 
the web through which they can communicate, spread 
propaganda, ideological material, strategic texts, tactical 
advice, among other activities. Several jihadist terrorist 
cells in Europe have utilized the internet when prepar-
ing for terrorism, the most prominent example being 
the Madrid cell. For an examination of the structure of 
online jihadism, consult Brynjar Lia, “Al-Qaeda Online: 
Understanding Jihadist Internet Infrastructure,” Jane’s 
Intelligence Review 18:1 (2006).
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of the attacks. They conducted extensive 
travel, attending language courses and 
religious training, and they consulted and 
trained with experienced mujahidin.
From a counter-terrorism perspective, 
the German case shows that despite the 
complexity of the threat, the security 
services have become better equipped to 
monitor and intercept jihadists through 
increased surveillance of travel and 
internet communications, in addition 
to monitoring Europe’s extremist 
communities more closely. As a result, 
the terrorists acquire more limited levels 
of training and are unable to obtain high 
levels of professionalism. The fact that 
jihadists travel despite the security risks 
is in itself an indicator that the internet 
alone does not presently provide sufficient 
levels of training. The interception of 
the IJU cell also shows that the security 
services have improved international 
cooperation and the capacity to deal with 
transnational networks. Accordingly, 
“homegrown” terrorism constitutes a 
lesser threat today than it did just a few 
years ago because the element of surprise 
represented by the mujahidin that attacked 
Madrid and London, and the killing of 
Dutch artist Theo Van Gogh, no longer 
exists. The irony of it all is that it looks 
as if the weakness of “homegrown cells” 
is that they are not “homegrown” enough, 
but still dependent on international 
contacts and support.19
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19  For a more thorough examination of the dilemma, see 
Nesser, “How Did Europe’s Global Jihadis Obtain Train-
ing for Their Militant Causes?”
Mapping the Factional 
Structure of the Sunni 
Insurgency in Iraq
By Michael Gabbay
the zeal and dexterity with which 
contemporary Islamist insurgent and 
terrorist groups convey their messages 
over the internet and satellite television 
channels is often cast as part of a public 
relations struggle with the United States 
over the hearts and minds of the Muslim 
masses.1 In Iraq, it is apparent, however, 
that these media also increasingly serve 
as forums in which insurgent groups 
compete with each other for the loyalties 
not of the population at large, but 
rather of those who already support the 
insurgency, including insurgent fighters 
themselves. Accordingly, an analysis of 
insurgent rhetoric can provide a window 
into the factional structure and dynamics 
within the insurgency. 
This paper describes a quantitative 
methodology for constructing diagrams 
that characterize and clarify insurgency 
factional structure using insurgent 
rhetoric as data. These “factional maps” 
can shed insight into insurgent dynamics 
involving cooperation, rivalries, decision-
making and organizational cohesion. The 
results suggest that the coarse-graining of 
the Sunni insurgency into a nationalist-
leaning camp on one side and al-Qa`ida-
inspired jihadist Salafists on the other 
needs to be further resolved to serve as a 
guide for U.S. counter-insurgency policy.
Factional Mapping Methodology
The data used to construct the Iraqi 
factional maps includes 11 Sunni insurgent 
groups listed in Table 1 and spans the time 
period from August 2005 through April 
2007, just prior to a process of alliance 
formation among the nationalist-leaning 
groups. The data set consists of hundreds 
of translated insurgent statements from 
jihadist websites and interviews of 
insurgent group officials in print and 
broadcast media as provided by the Open 
Source Center (OSC).
The notion of factional structure involves 
the integration of measures of: (i) insurgent 
1  The author would like to thank Mohammed Hafez for 
enlightening discussions that helped contribute to this 
paper. This work was supported by the Office of Naval 
Research under award number N00014-06-1-0471.
group ideological or strategic differences; 
(ii) cooperative relationships between 
groups; and (iii) the overall influence 
of each group. The methodology fuses 
concepts from social network analysis 
and spatial models of politics, which 
frame political competition and voting 
behavior as occurring along a policy or 
ideology space.2
For the ideology measure, differences in 
the mix of target classes that are claimed 
by insurgent groups are considered. The 
motivation behind this choice is that 
disagreement over what types of targets 
are legitimate has often been the primary 
source of dissension within Islamist 
insurgencies.3 The value of a targeting policy 
variable is calculated, which essentially 
scores each insurgent group by the average 
legitimacy of the target classes it claims 
operations against, where the legitimacy 
of each target class is the acceptability 
of attacking it as perceived within the 
ensemble of insurgent groups (at least 
according to their public statements).4 
The targeting policy is plotted along the 
horizontal axis of the factional maps 
where lower scores indicate the presence 
of less acceptable, more controversial 
targeting claims.
For the cooperative relationship measure, 
the study analyzes the number of either joint 
communiqués or declared joint operations 
between groups; the strength of the 
relationship is indicated by the thickness of 
the links connecting groups in the factional 
maps. The overall influence of a given 
group is assessed via its prominence within 
the rhetoric of the other insurgent groups, 
under the assumption that more influential 
groups will be referred to more frequently 
by their insurgent brethren.5
2  Melvin J. Hinich and Michael C. Munger, Analytical 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
3  Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder, 
CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003).
4  Each insurgent group’s attitude regarding targeting a 
given class is rated on a 5-point scale: claimed = 2; legiti-
mate (but not claimed) = 1; no clear opinion = 0; weak con-
demnation = -1; strong condemnation = -2. The average of 
its attitude values across the groups is the legitimacy of 
a given target class. Listed in order of decreasing legiti-
macy values, the target classes are: U.S. forces (2); Shi`a 
militias (1.7); Iraqi government forces (1.7); police (1.6); 
spies and agents (1.2); Kurdish militias (1.1); Iraqi civil-
ian government (0.8); foreign civilians (0.6); oil pipelines 
(0.6); politicians (0.2); Sunni local leaders (0.1); Shi`a ci-
vilians (-0.6); and Sunni civilians (-0.8).
5  The prominence of a group is proportional to the num-
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Group Symbol






Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi 
Brigades
JAMI
Al-Qa`ida in Iraq AQI
Ansar al-Sunna Group ASG
Fatihin Army FA
Iraq’s Jihadist Leagues IJL






Table 1. Insurgent Groups Included in Analysis.
Factional Structure
The factional maps are shown in Figure 
1. Considering targeting policy, the 
groups are more evenly dispersed over 
the spectrum than expected from a simple 
binary division into nationalist-leaning 
and jihadist Salafist wings. Given its 
thinly-veiled, indiscriminate targeting of 
Shi`a and Sunni civilians, al-Qa`ida in 
Iraq appears on the extreme left whereas 
the Rashidin Army and the Salah al-Din 
al-Ayyubi Brigades, who unambiguously 
claim attacks only on U.S. forces, appear 
on the far right. In terms of prominence, 
AQI is seen to be very significant but 
nowhere near the dominant group 
that its overwhelming presence in the 
news coverage would suggest. It is the 
Islamic Army in Iraq that is seen to be 
most prominent followed by the 1920 
Revolution Brigades.6 On the low end of 
the scale, the little-known Shield of Islam 
Brigade is seen to have zero prominence 
having never been mentioned by other 
groups.
Observing the cooperative relationship 
networks, the joint operations network 
displays more symmetric cross-cutting 
between groups than does the network of 
joint communiqués. This likely indicates 
greater operational cooperation between 
field units on a local level as compared 
ber of times it is referred to by other groups in the form 
of: (i) joint communiqués; (ii) joint operations; and (iii) 
simple mentions unrelated to (i) and (ii). It is normalized 
so that a value of 1 indicates average prominence.
6 The influence of the 1920RB has been substantially re-
duced since it fissioned in March 2007, with the break-
away faction taking the name, Hamas of Iraq.
with the more selective cooperation 
between leadership elements required for 
issuing policy statements. The isolation 
of the jihadist Salafist groups—AQI 
and the Ansar al-Sunna group—on this 
leadership level is apparent. In contrast, 
the groups that are commonly considered 
to be more nationalist in orientation—
IAI, MA, 1920RB, JAMI, RA—are all 
inter-connected, forming a clique in 
social network terms. Moreover, given 
the substantial spread of these groups 
in targeting policy, the factional map 
suggests that it is on the level of ties 
among leaders, rather than ideological 
congruence, that the lumping of these 
groups into a single, nationalist-leaning 
camp is most on the mark. In terms of 
targeting policy, the IAI, which trumpets 
operations against an expansive list of 
Iraqi targets—national forces, police, Shi`a 
and Kurdish militias, spies and agents, 
government officials, and politicians—is 
far closer to the ASG than it is to most of 
the nationalist groups.7
It is striking that the IAI appears as the 
most prominent group and also at the 
center of the targeting policy spectrum. 
This is suggestive of a spatial politics 
paradigm in which positioning oneself 
at the location of the median voter is 
advantageous, but where the “voters” in 
this case happen to be the insurgency’s 
pool of fighters and active supporters. 
Such a perspective implies that the IAI 
built up its power by appealing to both 
Salafists on the left and nationalists on 
the right—an inference about its factional 
composition that has crucial implications 
as will be analyzed below. The mixed 
composition of the IAI is also suggested 
by the joint operations network, where 
the IAI appears as a bridge between 
nationalist and jihadist Salafist groups. 
The IAI may, therefore, be better 
positioned than other nationalist groups 
to absorb fighters defecting from AQI 
in the wake of the recent degradation of 
AQI’s capabilities. 
A strong indication that targeting policy is 
indicative of broader ideological divisions 
is the fact that three major alliances of 
insurgent groups have nucleated around 
the most prominent group in each region 
of  the  spectrum:  AQI’s Islamic  State  of 
7  The strong Salafist strain in the IAI’s overall rhetoric is 
described in Pascale Combelles Siegel, “Partner or Spoil-
er: The Case of the Islamic Army in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 
1:2 (2008).
Figure 1. Factional map diagrams for the period Aug. 2005 
- Apr. 2007. Links represent: (a) joint communiqués and (b) 
joint operations.
Iraq on the left; IAI’s Jihad and Reform 
Front in the middle, which includes the 
Mujahidin Army and a splinter group of 
ASG (and at one point the Fatihin Army); 
and, on the right, the 1920RB’s Jihad and 
Change Front which includes the Rashidin 
Army as well as some smaller groups.8 A 
broad coalition called the Political Council 
for Iraqi Resistance (PCIR) has appeared 
recently whose members are the Jihad 
and Reform Front, JAMI and Hamas of 
Iraq. The dispersion of its members along 
the targeting policy spectrum, however, 
suggests that its cohesion is not high; it 
is doubtful that JAMI, which does not 
claim operations against Iraqi targets and 
has opposed targeting the police and Iraqi 
state institutions, would have the same 
underlying strategic agenda as the IAI. 
Consequently, the PCIR should not be 
considered as an IAI-led alliance. Rather, 
it may be intended primarily as a bloc for 
negotiating with the United States. Yet 
8  Since its split in March 2007, 1920RB has only claimed 
U.S. targets, which would give it the same targeting 
policy as RA. Hamas of Iraq has claimed attacks against 
Shi`a militias, however.






the fact that the PCIR’s most prominent 
member is also its most extreme could 
have serious implications for the demands 
of the PCIR in negotiations, particularly 
with respect to power-sharing with 
Shi`a.
Nationalist Ideological and Strategic 
Divergences
This study suggests the conclusion that 
the spread of nationalist-leaning groups 
along the targeting policy dimension 
reflects fundamental differences in 
their underlying ideologies, goals and 
constituencies. If true, this could help 
explain the lack of greater consolidation 
among nationalist groups which would 
otherwise be puzzling given that their 
professed high level political goals are 
essentially identical: a territorially intact, 
non-federal Iraq with a basis in Islamic 
law and a place for all Iraqi sects and 
ethnic groups. This study’s inference 
that the IAI’s power base is composed 
of both Salafist and nationalist factions 
implies that in order to satisfy both 
constituencies, the IAI, for reasons of 
organizational cohesion and survival, 
must jointly pursue the goals that each 
constituency holds most dear; for the 
Salafists, that is Sunni Shari`a rule, and 
for the nationalists, it is an intact Iraq. 
Accordingly, this paper contends that the 
IAI and its allies are deeply committed 
to re-establishing Sunni central rule 
in Iraq—a revanche, however, that is 
unmistakably religious in nature and for 
which heavy sectarian bloodletting is an 
acceptable cost. The IAI’s declaration 
that the “Iranian occupation” is more 
dangerous than the U.S. one indicates 
that it is the Shi`a threat axis which is 
of highest priority.9 The possibility that 
the IAI may be gearing up for a renewed 
sectarian battle is supported by its recent 
formation of special anti-Shi`a militia 
units dedicated to “purifying the land of 
Iraq from the Safavid enemy.”10 The IAI 
does not explicitly state its goal of seizing 
power, cannily calling for the formation 
of a technocratic government. The public 
presentation of a watered-down agenda 
with real goals concealed, as well as the 
instrumental formation of broad but loose 
coalitions, such as the PCIR, is classic 
9  OSC, “Iraqi Islamic Army Spokesman on Resistance 
Operations, Talks with Americans,” April 11, 2007.
10  OSC, “Islamic Army in Iraq Announces New Anti-
Shia Militia Units, Post Video,” October 8, 2007.
insurgent strategy.11 The supposition 
that the IAI is a mix of  Salafists and 
nationalists, however, should also be 
borne in mind as it implies that the IAI’s 
freedom of maneuver is limited and it 
could fracture if the twin goals of Sunni 
rule and an intact Iraq become ever more 
at odds. 
In contrast, groups on the right side of the 
spectrum, such as the 1920 Revolution 
Brigades and the Rashidin Army, have 
primarily a nationalist constituency. 
Consequently, they appear more 
committed to preserving the integrity of 
Iraq’s Arab nature—within the context of 
an expulsion of U.S. forces—rather than 
imposing Sunni religious dominance. 
Although they no doubt harbor ambitions 
of seizing central power themselves, their 
strategy for doing so likely stops short 
of re-igniting a Sunni-Shi`a civil war. 
Rather, they may hope that in the event 
of a U.S. withdrawal, the acclaim that 
they and their religious authority—the 
Association of Muslim Scholars—would 
garner from their longstanding and 
consistent defiance of the United States, 
combined with the less hostile face they 
present toward the Shi`a, will translate 
into national political legitimacy and 
power. If this is indeed their strategy, 
they can be expected to publicly position 
themselves as the most implacable of foes 
to the United States. This may explain 
their absence from the PCIR, if that 
organization is indeed intended to provide 
a platform for negotiating with the United 
States, and would also be consistent with 
their growing criticism of the Awakening 
Councils. Yet, if faced with an increasingly 
real prospect of Iraq’s partition, these 
groups would be more disposed to settle 
for a lesser goal of Sunni parity with the 
Shi`a, in which Sunnis are given what 
they perceive as a fair share of power in 
an Iraq freed of U.S. occupation. Tellingly, 
both the 1920RB and RA have dismissed 
the idea that the “Iranian occupation” is 
more dangerous than the U.S. one, which 
can be interpreted as both a rejection of 
a sectarian strategy and the notion that 
cutting a deal with the United States is the 
lesser of two evils.12
11 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 
1964).
12  OSC, “Jazirah TV’s Talk Show Discusses Expected US 
Strike Against Iran,” September 23, 2007; OSC, “Jihadist 
Forum Posts Interview with Al-Rashidin Army Amir,” 
August 8, 2007.
Conclusion
The factional mapping methodology 
presented in this paper uses insurgent 
rhetoric to generate a compact 
quantitative and visual representation of 
insurgency factional structure. Given the 
proliferation of insurgent groups in Iraq, 
the methodology provides a useful way of 
clarifying which groups are important, 
where they stand in relation to each other 
on an ideological and strategic level, 
and their cooperative relationships on a 
political and operational level. The use of 
targeting policy as an ideology indicator 
provides finer resolution of fundamental 
differences between insurgent groups 
than simply looking at their high 
level political goals. Consideration of 
declared political goals alone leads to 
overestimating the level of ideological 
congruence between the nationalist-
leaning groups, a misimpression that 
would be compounded by the apparently 
strong network of relationships among 
the leaderships of the major nationalist 
groups. Since the targeting policy is 
based on public rhetoric, it sheds light 
on the constituencies that insurgent 
groups rely on and compete over, and so 
can also be used to assess the factional 
composition within individual insurgent 
groups. This paper’s conclusions about 
the different composition and strategies 
of the nationalist-leaning groups may 
have a crucial bearing on the trajectories 
of the Sunni Awakening Council militias 
currently cooperating with the United 
States given that they are reported to have 
a substantial number of former insurgents 
in their ranks.
Michael Gabbay is a Lead Scientist with 
Information Systems Laboratories, Inc., a 
company with an emphasis on national security-
oriented R&D. Dr. Gabbay’s research focuses 
on the development of mathematical models and 
computational simulations of social and political 
systems including group decision-making and the 
dynamics of social networks. 
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Jihadists Target the 
American Dream
By Brian fishman
jihadist strategists are under no 
illusion that al-Qa`ida can destroy the 
United States militarily. As a result, 
jihadist thinkers have identified more 
creative strategies to mitigate U.S. 
military might, most of which attempt 
to exploit perceived social and political 
dynamics within the United States. 
These strategies are dangerous and often 
diabolically insightful. Such strategies are 
also overly optimistic, as they are often 
predicated on the faulty assumption that 
American society is inherently unstable 
and only needs a small push to degenerate 
into chaos. These strategies point to the 
complexity of al-Qa`ida’s war on the West 
and illustrate why the U.S. response must 
be just as calculated. 
Dividing America by Derailing its economy
In his seminal work, The Management of 
Savagery, Abu Bakr Naji argues that the 
power differential between the United 
States and its jihadist enemies is smaller 
than usually assumed.1 According to Naji, 
the ability of the United States to control 
events around the world is based largely 
on a “deceptive media halo” that has 
convinced governments and individuals 
that the United States is capable of 
directing world events.2 Naji argues that if 
jihadists can draw the United States into 
continual conflict in the Middle East, they 
can puncture this deceptive media halo. 
He also argues that the economic costs of 
such a conflict will spur internal social 
conflict in the United States, which will 
further undermine the halo. Naji believes 
that the United States is susceptible to 
internal conflict because the deceptive 
media halo papers over its own internal 
inconsistencies. According to Naji, by 
removing that halo, U.S. society will 
degenerate on its own.  
These arguments were applied to Iraq 
early in the war by the Anonymous 
author of Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Dreams, a 
jihadist blueprint for defeating the United 
1  Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, translated 
by William McCants, Combating Terrorism Center.
2 William McCants and Jarret Brachman, Stealing al-
Qa’ida’s Playbook (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism 
Center, February 2006).
States in Iraq.3 Iraqi Jihad is best known for 
its prescient analysis of Spanish public 
opinion just before the March 2004 
Madrid train bombings, but the book’s 
central thesis is that the United States can 
be beaten in Iraq by forcing it to bear the 
economic costs of rebuilding the country 
without allied help or an influx of Iraqi oil 
revenue.  
Urging attacks on U.S. allies and Iraq’s 
oil infrastructure, the author cites U.S. 
government reports to illustrate the high 
cost of the war. He ends the argument by 
triumphantly paraphrasing American 
pundits who argue that the war in Iraq 
is not worth the cost. Iraqi Jihad’s author 
understands that the U.S. economy will 
not collapse under war expenses, but he 
is heartened by the disagreements those 
costs create in American society.  
Targeting Race
Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi takes this 
argument one step further. Al-Qurashi 
posits that the dream of economic 
advancement is the only substantive 
social bond in American society. He is 
convinced that ethnic and racial diversity 
makes American society inherently 
unstable and concludes that if al-Qa`ida 
can sidetrack the U.S. economy, it can 
instigate racial strife that will weaken 
the United States:
it is clearly apparent that the 
American economy is America’s 
center of gravity. This is what 
Shaykh Usama bin Ladin has said 
quite explicitly. Supporting this 
penetrating strategic view is the fact 
that the Disunited States of America 
are a mixture of nationalities, ethnic 
groups, and races united only by 
the “American dream,” or, to put 
it more correctly, worship of the 
3  Anonymous, Iraqi Jihad: Hopes and Dreams, September 
2003; for more, see Brynjar Lia and Thomas Heggham-
mer, “Jihadi Strategic Studies: The Alleged al-Qa’ida 
Policy Study Preceding the Madrid Bombings,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 27:5 (2004).  
dollar, which they openly call “the 
Almighty Dollar.”4 
During the past year, al-Qa`ida has 
accelerated efforts to divide the United 
States along racial lines. In a video released 
on May 5, 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri spoke 
glowingly of Malcolm X, apparently in 
an effort to attract support from African 
American Muslims.5 Zawahiri mentioned 
him again in a December 2007 speech.6 
Zawahiri’s endorsement of Malcolm X 
makes no theological sense for a self-
declared Salafi-jihadist; Zawahiri’s name-
dropping was base politics.  
Cracking the U.S. Foundation
Not all jihadist efforts to generate discord 
within the United States are predicated 
on economics. Jihadists understand that 
the “American Dream” is an expansive 
concept that includes notions about 
liberty, equality and opportunity. In 
November 2006, Yaman Mukhaddab 
published an article assessing al-Qa`ida 
in Iraq’s declaration of the Islamic State of 
Iraq. Explicitly drawing on Naji’s earlier 
work, he listed al-Qa`ida’s most critical 
accomplishments in Iraq, culminating 
with the most important: 
to subject the enemy to a bloody 
exhaustion—first, to bleed him 
dry economically, and then to 
bleed him humanly, socially, and 
psychologically in a way he cannot 
bear or compensate. This is what 
will lead him to defeat in the end 
and to turn in on himself, losing 
the ability, desire, or determination 
to continue the conflict. This will 
surely be accompanied by social and 
civil collapses within the enemy. 
At best, his state may disappear; 
at worst, his power to intervene in 
Muslim affairs will collapse.7
4  Abu `Ubayd al-Qurashi, “A Lesson in War,” al-Ansar, 
December 19, 2002.
5  Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Interview With Ayman al-Zawa-
hiri,” al-Sahab, May 5, 2007. Zawahiri identified African 
American soldiers for a specific message: “I tell the sol-
dier of color in the American army that the racist Crusad-
er regime…altered the look of the shackles and changed 
the type of chains and try to make you believe that you 
are fighting for democracy and the American dream.”
6  Ayman al-Zawahiri, “Annapolis—The Betrayal,” De-
cember 14, 2007.
7  Yaman Mukhaddab, “Al-Qa’ida Between a Past Stage 
and One Announced by al-Muhajir,” Keepers of the 
Promise web forum, November 14, 2006.
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“During the past year, 
al-Qa`ida has accelerated 
efforts to divide the United 
States along racial lines.”
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Many of Mukhaddab’s arguments about 
al-Qa`ida’s successes in Iraq were 
premature. Since he wrote, the ISI has 
been condemned by jihadist scholars, 
isolated by Sunni tribal groups and chased 
out of many of its former strongholds. 
Operationally, al-Qa`ida in Iraq is in 
dire straits. Nonetheless, al-Qa`ida’s 
supporters will likely claim a strategic 
success in Iraq because of the economic 
and social strain the conflict places on 
the United States. For Mukhaddab, 
sustaining direct confrontation between 
al-Qa`ida and the United States—rather 
than operational victories—is the best 
indicator of strategic success. Glued to 
Western media for signs of social tension 
in the United States, Mukhaddab believes 
that sustained confrontation with al-
Qa`ida is eating at the very foundation of 
the country. As Mukhaddab sees it:
Al-Qa`ida has put a complete end to 
these foundations that hold together 
this doddering sinful society (The 
United States), held together as a 
society only by the values of personal 
freedom, the freedom to acquire, 
and the freedom of capital. As soon 
as these disappear, the bonds of 
the society, being based only on 
them, will of necessity dissolve. The 
collapse will become only a matter 
of time. It will take place when the 
citizens lose their patience over the 
disappearance of these foundations. 
And this is what has begun to be 
clearly visible in American society. 
Everything we read, hear, and see of 
commiseration about freedoms and 
unease about the repression and 
restriction of freedom of opinion 
and freedom of capital is only the 
first sign of this unrest over the loss 
of the foundations of the building of 
this vulgar, materialistic society.8
Mukhaddab’s argument suggests that 
partisan shouting matches pitting national 
security concerns diametrically against 
civil liberties do not completely reflect 
the strategic threat jihadists pose. Just as 
the 9/11 attacks were designed to bait the 
United States into invading Afghanistan, 
Mukhaddab hopes that continued conflict 
with al-Qa`ida will bait the United 
States into undermining its intellectual 
foundation.
8  Ibid.
Mukhaddab’s ideas are innovative, but 
that does not mean his strategy is viable. 
Like Iraqi Jihad’s author, Mukhaddab’s 
argument reveals that he misunderstands 
the utility of heated debates in a healthy 
democracy. There is no doubt that laws 
such as the USA PATRIOT Act spark 
impassioned arguments, but those 
disagreements hardly represent an 
existential threat to the United States. 
Considered within the historical scope of 
American efforts to balance civil liberties 
with national security concerns, these are 
solvable problems.
Key Issues for the Future
The vast majority of U.S. thinking 
about al-Qa`ida addresses the group’s 
ability to strike the United States and 
its allies militarily. This is appropriate, 
as a government’s first priority is to 
protect its citizens. Indeed, al-Qa`ida’s 
ability to strike at the United States in 
creative and dangerous ways should not 
be underestimated. Yet, the focus on 
al-Qa`ida’s military threat should not 
obscure the jihadist ideological assault on 
the American dream. The most important 
pieces of al-Qa`ida’s strategy to undermine 
the United States are social and political, 
not military. There are a number of lessons 
from this fight that should be applied to 
the U.S. strategy to combat al-Qa`ida and 
its associated movements.
1. Keep the eye on the ball. Al-Qa`ida wants to 
prevent the United States from being able 
to project power around the world. Since 
its ability to do so is a function of military, 
economic and political strength, al-Qa`ida 
would like nothing better than to distract 
the United States from policies that bolster 
and safeguard those strengths. Fighting 
jihadists is not a grand strategy by itself. 
Policies that undermine the international 
trading system, American competitiveness 
versus growing economies, the ability to 
project (and credibly threaten) military 
action against rivals and the ability to 
contain state challengers do not serve 
U.S. long-term interests.  
2. Jihadists understand the basis of American 
power. Naji, al-Qurashi and Mukhaddab 
correctly identify American ideals and 
economic strength as critical pillars of 
American power. Jihadists will target these 
pillars militarily, but they understand that 
in a war that will last decades, political 
and social attacks will be more effective. 
Al-Qa`ida has—and will again—attempt 
to bait the United States into military 
MARCH 2008 . Vol 1 . issue 4
actions that undermine American social, 
economic and political strengths.  
3. Jihadist thinkers assume that the American 
behemoth has a fragile core. Jihadists 
understand the power, but not the 
durability, of American ideals. Perhaps 
because of the religious grounding of their 
ideology, they do not fully comprehend 
the strength of a society built around 
secular concepts of liberty, equality and 
opportunity.
4. Jihadists will try to find credible messengers. 
Al-Qa`ida’s leaders understand they are 
not credible messengers to the American 
people, which is why al-Qa`ida’s most 
sophisticated propaganda videos cobble 
together commentary by Western 
pundits to advance their agenda.9 Al-
Qa`ida would like to invert the American 
strategy of finding and empowering 
voices that delegitimize al-Qa`ida among 
Muslims. For all of the reasons cited 
by Mukhaddab, however, Americans 
should be loath to stifle political debate 
for fear of manipulation by al-Qa`ida’s 
propagandists.
5. Jihadist predictions may backfire. Jihadist 
predictions of imminent social chaos 
in the United States serve an internal 
propaganda purpose. By offering 
prospective jihadists a blueprint for 
“victory,” they excite people to join the 
movement. In the long-run, however, 
this is a double-edged sword. If confident 
jihadist predictions of victory do not 
produce results, potential supporters may 
lose faith in their leadership.  
Brian Fishman is a Senior Associate at the 
Combating Terrorism Center and an Associate 
Professor in the Department of Social Sciences 
at West Point. Mr. Fishman has published 
numerous articles on al-Qa`ida’s strategy in Iraq 
and elsewhere. Before coming to the Combating 
Terrorism Center, Mr. Fishman worked on Defense 
and Foreign Affairs for Representative Lynn 
Woolsey. He has a BA from UCLA and a master’s 
degree in International Affairs from Columbia 
University’s School of International and Public 
Affairs.
9  “The Power of Truth,” al-Sahab, September 20, 2007.
15





the apparent ease with which 
predominantly foreign jihadists of the 
Salafist ideology are able to continually 
penetrate and manipulate the social, 
religious and professional spaces of 
micro-diaspora communities in support 
of global jihad indicates the strengthening 
of grassroots jihadist support structures. 
While the majority of Spanish Muslims 
are law abiding and consider themselves 
to be a part of Spanish civil society, 
increased numbers of what can be called a 
“third jihadist generation” are extending 
their base by leveraging socio-cultural 
and ideological variables.1 This emerging 
jihadist space is concerning primarily 
because it indicates that a strict and 
orthodox ideology advocating violent 
jihad is motivating and convincing 
Muslims to radicalize. Spanish police 
and intelligence sources are increasingly 
concerned about the growing influence 
of young, second generation militant 
Islamists.2 The aggressive nature of 
jihadist planning and recruitment 
activities in Spain highlights the need 
to have a counter-terrorism strategy 
that emphasizes the multifaceted 
social, cultural and political variables 
of grassroots Muslim communities 
throughout Spain.
Cultural and Demographic Variables in 
Recruitment Activity
The growth of micro-diaspora 
communities—predominantly formed of 
Maghrebis, Algerians and Pakistanis—is 
due to the continued influx of immigrants 
who travel to Spain for primarily family 
reasons and, therefore, employment. The 
importation of Salafist Islamist ideologies 
and jihadist sources of information, the 
growth of jihadist terrorist cells, radical 
imams, and the allure of defending the 
1  The third jihadist generation concept is based on Mus-
tafa bin `Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar’s (also known 
as Abu Mus`ab al-Suri) strategic thinking. See Murad al-
Shishani, “Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and the Third Generation 
of Salafi-Jihadists,” Terrorism Monitor 3:16 (2005). Span-
ish intelligence authorities believe that al-Suri played a 
direct role in planning the Madrid bombings.
2  El Pais, June 17, 2007; El Pais, July 2006. 
plight of the global umma have created 
new socio-cultural and ideological 
reference points for Spanish Muslims.
Since before the March 11, 2004 Madrid 
attacks, Salafist Islamists have been 
using international and localized cultural 
variables to influence the attitudes and 
behaviors of Spanish Muslims toward 
radicalization. Cultural variables are 
physical and non-physical local cultural 
characteristics in a demographic 
environment that shape attitudes and 
behavior patterns in response to ideas, 
and include:
- Physical transmitters: mosques, imams, 
educational institutions, books and tapes, 
family, social, prison and professional 
networks. This includes public spaces 
bordering ethnic and “native” communities.
- Non-physical transmitters: internet (online 
ideas), symbols and images, observable 
behaviors and activities, and codes of 
conduct.
Available information indicates that 
jihadist recruiters have been successful 
in exploiting cultural variables in distinct 
micro-diaspora communities to recruit 
Muslims in support of operations in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Spain, North Africa and 
elsewhere in Europe. This development 
is evidenced in the increased numbers 
of recruits to radicalization throughout 
Spain. For example, senior recruiters 
(typically the leaders of networks), 
spiritual leaders and explosives experts 
will identify, vet and then recruit new 
network or cell members for specialized 
activities, such as suicide operations, 
propaganda, or incorporation into 
logistical networks. As part of their 
recruitment tactics, recruiters seem to 
use different religious and socio-cultural 
variables to influence their recruits, 
and to facilitate their own integration 
into the micro-diaspora communities 
in which they are living and operating. 
Spanish counter-terrorism operations 
and investigations into jihadist cells and 
their recruitment activities will provide 
useful insights into and context about the 
ways that radicalized actors manipulate 
cultural variables to their advantage.
Case Study: Cultural Variables in the 
Recruitment Patterns of 11-M and 2007 
Barcelona Suicide Cell
In the cases of 11-M and the 2007 
Barcelona terrorist plot, senior members 
were radicalized abroad and had direct 
links to militant Islamist organizations. 
They maintained a strong commitment 
to global jihad, were devoutly religious, 
and were able to successfully recruit and 
radicalize Spanish Muslims from various 
ethnic pools of diaspora communities.  
The Dhadah Network: Recruiters centered 
their recruitment activities at the 
Madrid Abu Bakr mosque, and at social/
professional and religious gatherings to 
recruit sympathizers. Most of the Dhadah 
network’s members shared professional, 
social and family connections. Dhadah 
used a sophisticated step process, similar 
to a recruitment process, to identify 
and vet. As part of his recruitment 
activities, Dhadah would pass out 
jihadist propaganda in mosques in and 
around Madrid. His network recruited 
circa 20 new members during the 1990s: 
some were sent to training camps in 
Afghanistan, some of whom returned to 
Spain or traveled to other jihad fronts. 
In an attempt to identify prospective 
recruits, he studied the faces of people 
leaving the mosque after prayer sessions 
to approach those whom he considered to 
be of most interest. Once the potential of 
the individual was assessed, the recruiters 
would invite the individual to participate 
in innocuous meetings where they would 
discuss the situation of Islam. It is not 
clear from available information what the 
vetting process was for these members, 
or if the recruiters provided financial or 
other incentives (assistance with work, 
support to family members, etc.). 
Barcelona Kamikaze Recruitment Cell: In 
March 2007, Spanish security personnel 
broke up a jihadist recruitment cell that 
had trained and sent to Iraq an estimated 
32 jihadist suicide bombers. Spanish 
National Police sources noted that the 
recruiter, Moroccan Mbark El Jaafari, 
used a strategy to “Westernize” his 
typically young recruits so that they could 
better integrate into Catalonian society. 
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He purportedly encouraged the suicide 
bombers to wear jeans and modern dress, 
and to refrain from growing long beards; 
he would then send the recruits to smaller 
towns in Catalonia where a “sponsor” 
would help them find employment. After 
this socio-demographic preparation, the 
“trainees” would travel to Iraq, Algeria, 
or Afghanistan.3
Most recruits seem to be driven by two 
motivations: professional (to serve the 
global jihad), and spiritual and personal 
(a belief in martyrdom). While it is not 
clear from available information how 
strong the desire for martyrdom was for 
the recruits detained in Spain to date, the 
majority upheld an extreme religiosity. It 
is evident that Spanish Sunni Muslims are 
a recruitment target. What is not clear is 
what kind of Muslim becomes a target for 
jihadist recruiters, although the majority 
of recruitees have come into contact with 
the recruiters in shared religious and 
social networks. Some characteristics of 
potential recruits include: 
Socio-Demographic Factors
Radicalized Spanish Muslims are 
predominantly young, first generation 
adult males who attend any number of 
Muslim social and religious settings. 
Many are middle class, have been educated 
in Spain (some have advanced technical 
degrees), have family, and are fluent in 
Spanish. Some have obtained Spanish 
citizenship, but the majority possess 
work permits. It is likely that these young 
recruits have a strong spirituality and 
probably navigate in Islamist ideological 
circles, particularly mosques and 
organizations, such as Tablighi Jama`at 
(JaT) of the 11-M and Barcelona ‘08 
typology.
Authority Figures and Ideology
The imams and spiritual leaders recruiting 
for jihadist networks are marketing 
the religious concept of offensive jihad. 
Offensive jihad coincides remarkably with 
Abu Mus`ab al-Suri’s strategic concept 
that emphasizes “individual terrorism” 
and urges that mass mobilization and 
participation in individual terrorism is 
necessary for the jihadist movement’s 
success.4 These imams seem to have 
3  Kathryn Haahr, “Catalonia:  Europe’s New Center of 
Global Jihad,” Terrorism Monitor 5:11 (2007). 
4 Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu 
Musab al Suri: Architect of the New al Qaeda,” Studies 
in Conflict and Terrorism 30:1 (2007). Al-Suri is a Syrian-
been radicalized overseas and travel to 
Spain under special permits to instruct in 
mosques.5
Motivational Factors: Intent to Engage in 
Offensive Jihad
Detailed accounts of militant Islamists 
detained and imprisoned from 11-M to 
date indicate that the majority of jihadists 
were associated with Salafism prior to 
their radicalization to militant Islamism.6 
Experts now term these radicalized 
individuals as “neo-Salafists,” whose 
basis of jihad is founded on “an inflexible 
and timeless reading of the Qur’an and 
the hadiths. Neo-Salafists are socialized 
in an intense hatred of those they consider 
to be infidels and, among other possible 
interpretations, they accept the most clearly 
bellicose definition of jihad, both in terms of 
defense and aggression.”7 Al-Qa`ida’s and 
other Islamist organizations’ hostile rhetoric 
is aimed at recuperating al-Andalus (the 
Iberian Peninsula and Northern Africa 
during the Umayya Caliphate) and at Spain’s 
born, Spanish citizen, senior al-Qa`ida member whom 
the Pakistani security services arrested in 2005 in Wa-
ziristan.
5  Since 2004, Spanish security services have detained, 
and in some cases, expulsed, approximately 17 imams 
from primarily the northeast of Spain. For more infor-
mation on this, see Javier Jordan, “Las Redes Yihadistas 
en Espana: Evolucion desde el 11-M,” October 4, 2007, 
available at www.athenaintelligence.org. This article 
does not include the January 2008 arrest of the Barce-
lona imam in El Raval.
6  Javier Jordan, Fernando Manas and Humberto Tru-
jillo, “Perfil Sociocomportamental y estructura organiza-
tiva de la militancia yihadista en Espana: Analisis de las 
redes de Abu Dhadah y del 11-M,” Jihad Monitor, March 
8, 2007.
7 Fernando Reinares, “Conceptualizing International 
Terrorism,” ARI #82, Real Instituto Elcano, 2005.
involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Virtual and physical propaganda extolling 
the virtues of jihad could motivate curious, 
religiously motivated Muslims to seek out 
ideological and spiritual havens that lead 
them down the radicalization path.   
A detailed window into the existence 
and strengthening of micro-diaspora 
communities is Jordi Moreras Palenzuela’s 
singular examination of the dynamics of 
Catalonian Islam.  His most recent work 
focuses on the El Raval neighborhood 
in Barcelona in which the recent JaT-
associated Pakistani suicide bombing 
cell operated. El Raval is primarily 
dominated by Pakistanis who own their 
businesses, many that include women as 
business partners. The places of worship 
are predominantly Pakistani, and the 
Islamic expressions that are celebrated 
in the neighborhood are organized by 
Pakistani Muslims. In sum, El Raval is 
a nationalistic space in which politics 
(close ties to Pakistanis in Pakistan and 
the United Kingdom), religion, work 
and social life revolve around Pakistani 
elements.8 According to a Spanish report, 
jihadist networks recruit approximately 
three Spanish Muslims a month from 
Catalonia for either suicide bombings 
in Iraq, or for training in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and North Africa.9
An emerging characteristic of the Spanish 
jihadist model is unaffiliated terrorists 
who are part of informal, Salafist-
inspired groups that are not formally 
linked to any one terrorist organization 
and operate in a “bee-hive” organizational 
infrastructure. These individuals tend to 
organize themselves around a commonly 
shared ideology of global jihad, one in 
which the religion of Islam is molded to 
serve their violent objectives. At times, 
small groups of “independently” inspired 
radical Muslims appear in villages and 
towns throughout Spain, especially in 
agricultural areas, to troll for recruits. 
These individuals operate exclusively 
within Spain to recruit young Muslims 
into jihad after they have settled in Spain, 
as opposed to relying on foreign jihadists. 
Some recruits are converts, hence the 
concern about homegrown terrorists.  
8  Jordi Moreras Palenzuela, “Islam y Configuracion Co-
munitaria entre los Paquistanies en Barcelona,” CIDOB 
d’Afers Internacionals, núm. 68, p. 119-132.
9  El Periodico, April 2007.
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Table 1. Operational and Demographic Characteristics of Major Terrorist Attacks.*
* Created by author using information predominantly from media sources. For a detailed characterization of jihadists who have had prison sentences, see Fer-
nando Reinares, “Hacia una Caracterizacion Social del Terrorismo Yihadista en Espana: Implicaciones en Seguridad Interior y Accion Exterior,” ARI #34, Real 







Missions Links to AQ, Other 
Terrorist Groups 
Operations NOVA 
I & II ('04) 
Madrid 1st generation males; 
predominantly Moroccan 
immigrants (exact legal 
status not clear), but also a 
Spanish citizen, an Afghan 
and a Turk; several had 
been involved in delinquent 
crimes 
Tactical operational cell 
to conduct terrorist 
attack; explosives 
group; target was the 
Madrid headquarters of 
the National Court 
"Martyrs for Morocco," 
professed allegiance to 
GIA; several had 







1st generation males; 11 
Moroccans, two Algerians, 
two from Ceuta (legal 
status unclear); some had 
committed petty crimes 
Recruitment cell for 
jihadist operations in 
Iraq 
11 cell members linked 
to Ansar al-Islam; five 
had links to 11-M 
network 
Pakistani Cell ('05) Barcelona Pakistani 1st generation 
males (exact legal status 
not clear); some were 
residents 
Tactical operational cell 
to conduct terrorist 
attack; explosives 
group; targets were 
civilian landmarks 
Head of cell was linked 
to Mohamed the 
Egyptian, senior 
member of 11-M 
Operations Chacal 





15 Moroccan male 
immigrants (exact legal 
status not known), 
including three Spanish 
citizens and other 
nationalities; Moroccans 
had ties to other European 
jihadist cells 
Recruitment cells for 
proselytism, recruits for 
jihad in Iraq, North 
Africa
Cell believed to be a 
Moroccan branch in 
Spain of Hizb al-Tahrir  
Ceuta Operation 
('06) 
Ceuta Young men, all except one 
(Moroccan on work permit) 
were Spanish citizens (one 
was member of Spanish 
Armed Forces)  
Recruitment cell for 
jihadist activities; 
tactical operational cell 
for planning explosives 
attack against various 







Moroccans and Algerians, 
reportedly tied to '06 
jihadist networks (see 
Chacal and Camaleon) 
Recruitment cell for 
proselytism, recruits for 
jihad in Iraq, North 
Africa; the imam of 
Santa Coloma de 
Gramanet was arrested 
for preaching militant 
Islamism and 
recruitment 
Cell believed to be a 
Moroccan branch in 
Spain of Hizb al-Tahrir; 
AQIM; some helped 
several 11-M members 
escape
Suicide Cell ('07) Reus Leader of cell was 
Moroccan immigrant, had 
legal papers; tied to 
Casablanca terrorist attack; 
use of cultural cues for 
covert recruitment and 
indoctrinization  
Suicide recruits for 
Iraq, and for jihad in 
Algeria and Morocco 
Provided terrorist 
infrastructure 




Barcelona 1st generation Pakistani 
males, radicalized abroad, 
legal residents, work 
permits; cell had 
designated spiritual leaders 
(including an imam) 
Tactical operational 
terrorist cell; explosives 
group; targets included 
metro 
Cell members identified 
themselves as of the 
Tabligh ideology 
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Observations of Trends and Indicators
While there is no general culture of a 
global jihad movement among Spanish 
Muslims, Spain is experiencing the rooting 
of Islamist movements and ideologies. The 
most significant aspect of radicalization 
in Spain is Salafist Islamism’s espousal 
of radical activities, namely recruiting 
for global jihad in sermons and outreach 
activities at official and unofficial 
mosques. Future trigger points are in the 
creation of parallel Muslim societies—
already in place in countries like France 
and the United Kingdom—which would 
certainly be more permeable to jihadist 
doctrines and activities. A characteristic 
to consider is where there are centers of 
gravity and what these centers and their 
pathways tell counter-terrorism analysts 
and operators about the variables involved 
in shifting attitudes and behaviors toward 
radicalization. Some of the more important 
signposts to assess are:
- Role and evolution of radical ideas. 
Transnational jihadist networks 
increasingly are influencing the 
perceptions, ideas and beliefs that 
contribute to the growth of Islamist 
radicalization and mobilization, and seek 
to target all Muslims in their global reach. 
Two important considerations should be 
noted: first, the appeal of neo-Salafism 
clearly has taken root in various diaspora 
communities that include both lower 
and middle classes; second, not all of the 
radicalized Spanish Muslims have been 
socially and economically marginalized. 
Therefore, it is crucial to understand in 
which ways religion and other doctrinal 
characteristics could be outweighing socio-
economic considerations in influencing 
shifting attitudes and behavior patterns 
toward radicalization.10 
10  Of course, Salafist movements will continue to target 
immigrant populations that are socially and economical-
ly excluded and live in marginalized diaspora societies.
- Current and future leadership of Muslim 
organizations. An understanding of who 
is emerging to inspire Spanish Muslims, 
as well as non-Muslims, in religious 
and intellectual ways is important for 
appreciating the future political and 
social sentiments of future generations 
of Spanish Muslims, especially those 
in positions of authority in religious 
and social organizations. Intra-ethnic 
tensions, which already play out in the 
competition among various Islamic and 
Islamist organizations, could cause a 
splintering between groups and their 
followers in crucial areas such as support 
for Islamic law. There are overt and 
subtle indicators of wedging for counter-
terrorism operators to evaluate, the 
most important variable being the use of 
rhetoric in media and non-media sources, 
and indications of social stratification in 
the micro-diaspora communities.11
- Changing role of the internet. A trend 
in Spain is the departure from “physical 
recruitment” activities toward virtual 
recruitment. CDs, laptops (11-M) and 
the internet are driving self-recruitment 
activity. Nonetheless, at some point, a 
spiritual leader has, thus far, been needed 
to further guide the young recruits toward 
deeper spiritual lessons. To date, almost 
all of the major jihadist networks had 
created structured recruitment activities; 
it is difficult to ascertain the a priori 
exposure of the recruitees to internet 
recruitment, to Islamist ideologues such 
as Abu Mus`ab al-Suri, or to radical 
Islamic messages. For example, a Burgos 
jihadist indoctrinization cell was the first 
plot detected and broken up in Spain that 
followed and promoted global jihad via 
the internet.12
- Strengthening of “mobile jihad satellite 
platforms”13 that can only exist based on 
a grassroots support base. The primary 
nodes in this model are Barcelona, Madrid, 
Andalusia and the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla. The members of 
these jihadist networks are multiethnic 
and interconnected not only with each 
other, but with other jihadist networks 
in Europe. For example, senior members 
11  The author has developed a methodoligal approach to 
identify and weight the cultural variables that influence 
radicalized attitudes and behaviors.
12   El Pais, October 2007.  
13  Analyst term; refer to Kathryn Haahr, “New Reports 
Allege Foreign Fighters in Iraq Returning to Europe,” 
Terrorism Focus 3:20 (2006).
of the 11-M and Abu Dhadah networks not 
only interacted closely, but maintained 
ties with several members of the Hamburg 
cell.14 To date, all members of the 
jihadist networks have demonstrated a 
commitment to both regional (Iraq, North 
Africa) and local (Spain) jihads. This dual 
operational and doctrinal capability to 
carry out terrorist attacks becomes akin 
to a borderless entity and poses tough 
challenges to Spanish and European 
counter-terrorism operations. 
- Increase in suicide bombing tactics and 
techniques. Al-Qa`ida in the Islamic 
Maghreb and Pakistani jihadists who have 
trained in Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan 
are bringing back not only ideological and 
recruitment tactics from the international 
jihad, but also the combat techniques, 
such as IEDs, suicide bombings and 
potential chemical attacks. The Spanish 
Guardia Civil has assessed the January 
2008 suicide cell in Barcelona as having 
an identical profile to the London group 
that perpetrated the 2005 attacks.15
Kathryn Haahr is a national security 
consultant to public and private sector 
clients on a range of issues in the areas of 
international security and regional threats. 
She focuses on the intersection of cultural 
influences and terrorism dynamics, energy 
security, WMD, and other transnational 
subjects. Ms. Haahr received a master’s 
degree in International Public Policy with 
a concentration in Middle Eastern and 
European Comparative and Regional Studies 
from the Johns Hopkins University School of 
Advanced International Studies.
14  For specific details, see Jordan, “Perfil Sociocomporta-
mental y estructura organizativa de la militancia yihadis-
ta en Espana: Analisis de las redes de Abu Dhadah y del 
11-M” and Kathryn Haahr, “Assessing Spain’s al-Qaeda 
Network,” Terrorism Monitor 3:13 (2005).
15  El Pais, January 2008.
MARCH 2008 . Vol 1 . issue 4
“Nonetheless, at some 
point, a spiritual leader 
has, thus far, been needed 
to further guide the young 
recruits toward deeper 
spiritual lessons.”
19
Fulda Gap against imaginary Soviet tank 
divisions using the same tactics employed 
in the Second World War. In the same 
way, the belief that the United States 
might someday fight like Israel did in 
2006 is being used by some to argue for 
a reversion back to what the U.S. military 
does best and finds easiest: conventional 
warfare. 
That said, the comparison between the 
IDF and the U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps is admittedly tempting. Following 
Israel’s 2000 withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon, the IDF grew accustomed to 
operations in the Palestinian Territories 
which, in some ways, closely resemble the 
counter-insurgency operations currently 
being undertaken by the U.S. Army and 
Marine Corps in Iraq. The IDF then grew 
complacent and rusty. Furthermore, 
although many units performed admirably 
in southern Lebanon, as a whole the 
IDF was caught off-guard by the kind 
of fighting they experienced there. The 
reserves, especially, were poorly prepared 
and inadequately equipped. 
There are several reasons, however, 
why this analogy does not hold as much 
water as some would like. First, the U.S. 
Army and Marine Corps are not the IDF. 
Whereas the U.S. military, post-Vietnam, 
is a professional military, the IDF is still 
largely manned by conscripts. While 
the IDF soldier’s ferocity, patriotism 
and tactical decision-making have 
often been noted as being among his 
strengths, individual soldier discipline 
is rarely mentioned as a trait for which 
the IDF soldier is praised. Some units 
take particular pride in their indiscipline 
and scruffy appearance. This may have 
positive effects on morale in some cases. 
Yet, in asking how Hizb Allah intercepted 
Israeli communications during the 2006 
war, it is worth noting that in cases 
when encrypted communication failed, 
IDF soldiers simply used their personal 
cellular phones to communicate on the 
battlefield.3 It is hard to imagine a U.S. 
Marine Corps gunnery sergeant allowing 
a similar situation. 
In the same way, it is similarly hard to 
imagine the U.S. military’s professional 
and non-commissioned officer corps 
allowing the kind of institutional 
complacency that haunted the IDF in 
the years following 2000. Simply put, 
the cultural differences between the U.S. 
military and the IDF—and the differences 
between conscripted armies and 
professional armies—must be taken into 
account before any comparison is made 
between historical experiences.
The greatest mistake the U.S. military 
can make in studying the lessons of 2006, 
however, is to study the 34 days of fighting 
that took place in southern Lebanon in 
July and August of that year without any 
context. Nevertheless, this seems to be 
what is happening. 
In January, during a conference in which 
the author participated at the U.S. Army 
War College on what lessons can be 
drawn from the conflict with respect 
to information operations, Hizb Allah 
was widely considered to have cleverly 
manipulated the media during the conflict. 
Yet, if one were to ask Hizb Allah about 
their information operations during the 
conflict, the internal assessment would 
be much more negative. Indeed, during 
the 34 days of fighting, Hizb Allah’s 
performance in the sphere of information 
operations was uneven. Where Hizb Allah 
enjoyed the most success in information 
operations was in the years before the 
conflict—carefully setting the conditions 
within which the battle would be fought—
and in the weeks and months after the 
shooting stopped. The information 
operations campaign is not confined to a 
34-day window of time, and an attempt to 
understand Hizb Allah’s success in that 
field is doomed to fail if confined as such. 
In the same way, the U.S. military’s 
insistence upon only studying the tactical 
lessons provided by the 34 days of open 
fighting between the IDF and Hizb Allah 
is also misguided. As U.S. Army Captain 
Daniel Helmer persuasively argues in 
his study of the IDF’s failed counter-
insurgency efforts in southern Lebanon 
from 1982 to 2000, Israel never dealt with 
3  Personal interviews, IDF officers, November 2006 and 
January 2008.
Drawing the Right Lessons 
from Israel’s War with 
Hizb Allah
By andrew exum
a recent article in USA Today announced 
that the U.S. military was learning from 
Israel’s 2006 war against Hizb Allah in 
southern Lebanon. The lesson, at first, 
seems to be clear. “Counterinsurgency 
tactics,” USA Today reported, “could leave 
U.S. forces vulnerable to the kind of 
coordinated attacks that stymied Israel.”1 
Echoing these concerns and writing in 
World Politics Review on March 4, West 
Point professor Gian Gentile argued that 
the U.S. Army had already become like the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), “so focused 
on irregular and counterinsurgency 
warfare that it can no longer fight large 
battles against a conventional enemy.”2 Is 
this true, and is the U.S. military drawing 
the correct lessons from the 2006 war? 
It is impossible to gauge the degree to 
which the U.S. Army’s conventional 
combat skills have been eroded by the 
focus on counter-insurgency warfare in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. It is certainly likely 
that the high operations tempo, endless 
deployments and shortened training 
schedules have more to do with any 
erosion in collective task proficiencies 
than counter-insurgency manual FM 3-24. 
Yet, the U.S. military is almost certainly 
drawing the wrong lessons from the 2006 
war if it is used to ignore the hard won 
lessons of counter-insurgency and revert 
back to the kind of conventional war-
fighting with which the U.S. military has 
always been more comfortable. 
Drawing the wrong lessons has happened 
before. In the aftermath of the Vietnam 
War, the presence of a conventional 
threat from the Soviet Union allowed the 
U.S. Army and Marine Corps to shelve 
the counter-insurgency lessons learned 
during more than a decade of fighting 
in Southeast Asia. Counter-insurgency 
warfare, as John Nagl is fond of saying, is 
“graduate level warfare.” Intellectually, 
then, it was easier for the U.S. Army 
officer corps to go back to defending the 
1  Tom Vanden Brook, “US Learns from Israel-Hizbollah 
War,” USA Today, February 14, 2008.
2  Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. 
Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” World Politics Re-
view, March 4, 2008.
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the root political problems in southern 
Lebanon that led to the rise of Hizb 
Allah.4 The 2006 war did not take place in 
a 34-day vacuum; it was merely the latest 
bloodshed in a dispute between Israel 
and Hizb Allah that has been fought with 
varying degrees of intensity since 1982. 
The 2006 war was not evidence, then, 
that Israel had over-learned the lessons 
of counter-insurgency, but rather the 
opposite: Israel has never effectively 
learned counter-insurgency in the first 
place. Even in the West Bank and Gaza, 
the IDF continues to approach the 
fighting there as a counter-terrorism 
mission instead of a counter-insurgency 
mission. Moreover, while the presence 
of both a radicalized settler population 
and historical animosities might preclude 
the application of an effective counter-
insurgency strategy in the Occupied 
Territories, Israel has never developed 
and applied counter-insurgency doctrine 
along the lines of FM 3-24 despite years 
of experience in irregular warfare dating 
back to Jewish guerrilla groups in pre-
state Israel.
Finally, unless the Mexican government 
dissolves and a modern-day Pancho Villa 
begins to lob Katyusha rockets across 
the border into Texas, it is unlikely the 
U.S. military will ever face an adversary 
exactly like Hizb Allah. Yet, in more 
general terms, Israel’s war against Hizb 
Allah belongs to the kind of conflicts that 
political scientist Erin Simpson labels 
“hybrid wars.”5 These wars occur when 
nation-states go to war against non-state or 
sub-state actors and combine elements of 
conventional warfare with characteristics 
of irregular warfare. Although air power 
enthusiasts such as Major General 
Charles Dunlap have argued for a more 
robust use of air power in unconventional 
war, historical evidence suggests that air 
power based punishment strategies such 
as that employed by Israel in 2006 are 
not effective against guerrilla groups in 
hybrid wars.6 
4 Daniel Isaac Helmer, Flipside of the COIN: Israel’s Leba-
nese Incursion Between 1982-2000 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2007).
5 Erin M. Simpson, “Thinking about Modern Conflict: 
Hybrid Wars, Strategy, and War Aims,” paper presented 
to the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science 
Association, Chicago, April 7-11, 2005.
6  Robert A. Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion 
in War (New York: Cornell University Press, 1996).
Mastering hybrid warfare means 
mastering the tactics found in both FM 
3-24 and FM 7-8. U.S. Army and Marine 
Corps units must be proficient in both 
conventional combined arms combat as 
well as the kind of population-centric 
approach encapsulated in the new counter-
insurgency doctrine. This is clearly asking 
a lot of the officer corps, but perhaps not 
any more than what has been asked of it 
already in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Hybrid warfare also means civilian 
and strategic decision-makers must be 
realistic about what military power alone 
can accomplish in such conflicts. By all 
accounts, the IDF was sent into southern 
Lebanon with an impossible mission—to 
“destroy” Hizb Allah. By 2006, however, 
Hizb Allah had grown into a political-
military organization claiming the 
loyalty of perhaps 1.5 million Lebanese 
Shi`a. Hizb Allah runs schools, 
manages hospitals and elects members 
of parliament. No military on the planet 
could have been expected to destroy the 
organization in 34 days of fighting.
In some wars, history teaches us that you 
cannot shoot or kill your way to victory. 
As U.S. Army Colonel H.R. McMaster has 
written, “the principal lesson of the wars in 
Afghanistan, Iraq and southern Lebanon 
might be that military campaigns must 
be subordinate to a larger strategy that 
integrates political, military, diplomatic, 
economic and strategic communication 
efforts.”7 Guns, bombs and tactics from 
the Second World War are simply not 
enough. This has been the harsh lesson 
of the U.S. military’s counter-insurgency 
campaigns since 2001, and this is also the 
enduring lesson of Israel’s war with Hizb 
Allah.  
Andrew Exum is a graduate of the University 
of Pennsylvania and the American University 
of Beirut. He is currently a Ph.D. candidate 
in the War Studies Department at King’s 
College London where he studies Hizb Allah 
and military innovation theory. A former 
U.S. Army officer, Mr. Exum led a platoon 
of light infantry in Afghanistan (2002) and 
then a platoon of Army Rangers in Iraq 
(2003) and Afghanistan (2004). He is the 
author of This Man’s Army: A Soldier’s 
Story from the Front Lines of the War on 
Terrorism (2004) and “Hizballah at War: 
A Military Assessment” (2006).
7  H.R. McMaster, “On War: Lessons to be Learned,” Sur-
vival 50:1 (2008): pp. 19-30. 
Guest Commentary: 
Benazir Bhutto’s Doomed 
Return to Pakistan
By James r. ellis, lt. Gen. u.s. army (ret.)
two months have passed since Benazir 
Bhutto’s assassination. After listening to 
the news and commentary, I decided to 
offer a personal perspective having spent 
two years in Pakistan during the period of 
Bhutto’s first term as prime minister. 
My assignment to Pakistan was in 
response to the August 1988 plane crash 
that killed President Zia ul-Haq, more 
than a dozen of his government officials, 
U.S. Ambassador Arnie Raphel, and the 
senior U.S. military officer in the country, 
Army Brigadier General Herb Wassom. 
After the crash, my wife and I were 
rushed to Islamabad where I replaced 
General Wassom. At that time, there were 
several key issues at stake: heightened 
tensions between Pakistan and India 
(over Kashmir and other concerns); 
operation of a multibillion dollar Military 
Assistance Program; the investigation 
into the cause of the plane crash; and 
support for the Afghan “freedom fighters” 
(mujahidin) opposing both the invading 
Soviet Army and the puppet communist 
government in Kabul (although this was 
not within my charter, I did get to know 
many of the U.S., Pakistani and Afghan 
leaders of that effort). One immediate goal 
was encouraging the Pakistani military to 
support the return to civilian government, 
and it was the subsequent election that 
fall which brought Bhutto to power.
 
Pakistan has a most unique culture formed 
by more than 4,000 years of South Asian 
(Hindu) history, 1,300 years of Islamic 
religion and 200 years of British rule. It is 
surrounded by Afghanistan, Iran, India, 
China and the former Soviet Union—a 
tough neighborhood. Internal strife is the 
norm, suspicion of and conflict with India 
is a constant, and the border area with 
Afghanistan is as wild as any place in the 
world. No one (Alexander the Great, India, 
Russia, or Britain) has ever been able to 
control the region or the tribes there, nor 
can the current Pakistani government. 
The several times I visited the area, I was 
always with a Pakistani Army escort. The 
U.S. press and many policymakers are 
relatively uninformed about the culture, 
geography and demography of this country 
that is so key to the “war on terrorism” 
MARCH 2008 . Vol 1 . issue 4
21
and to stability in a critical region of the 
world. Also, it should not be forgotten 
that Pakistan is an Islamic country and 
more than 99.5% of the population (160 
million) is Muslim.
I met Bhutto a few times during her 
first term. She was personable and 
engaging, but had problems governing 
due to persistent accusations that she 
and her family were corrupt. In fact, it 
was charges of corruption that led to her 
removal from the prime minister position 
on two occasions. There are strong 
allegations that the Bhutto family stole 
billions from the national treasury and 
government contracts while she was in 
office. Her husband was known as “Mr. 
Ten Percent,” meaning that if one wanted 
to do business with the government of 
Pakistan they had to pay him 10% of the 
contract. He spent several years in jail on 
corruption charges. 
Bhutto had many enemies—including 
some members of her own family who 
believed that she was involved in the 
death of at least one of her brothers. Also, 
her political party, the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP), is only one of several vying 
for power. Many groups had a motive for 
her assassination.
Bhutto had been a darling of the U.S. press, 
and from her return to Pakistan until her 
assassination the media failed to present 
her in a balanced manner. If Bhutto’s full 
history had been highlighted ahead of 
her return, there would have been less 
hope in the West that she would “restore 
democracy” and a greater realization 
that her return was fraught with danger. 
It has been reported that the U.S. State 
Department brokered her return as a 
way of bolstering U.S. and international 
support for Pakistan and its continued 
assistance in the war on terrorism. Now, 
as a result of her assassination, this move 
could backfire, a consequence that should 
have been foreseen. 
Some pundits have railed against 
Pakistan’s inability to protect a political 
candidate. Yet, from the time it was 
announced that Bhutto would return it was 
a foregone conclusion that assassination 
attempts would be made against her. 
Given the way she mingled with the 
crowds and the fact that crowd control 
in the country is extremely difficult, it 
was only a matter of time before someone 
or some group was successful. Indeed, 
before criticizing other governments 
for failure to provide security to their 
political leaders, we should look at our 
own history to see how difficult this can 
be. The United States has had four 
presidents assassinated in its history, 
and there have been many assassination 
attempts against sitting presidents and 
presidential candidates. Just in the 60 
years since Pakistan became a separate 
country (1947), the United States has seen 
the assassination of both President John 
F. Kennedy and presidential candidate 
Senator Bobby Kennedy. Additionally, 
there were more than a half-dozen other 
assassination attempts, including the 
shooting of President Ronald Reagan. 
This country, however, has been strong 
enough to survive such violence without 
destroying our constitution or our 
democratic values.
Now, the United States must look beyond 
Bhutto’s assassination because a more 
serious concern is the future stability of 
Pakistan, and the guaranteed security 
of the country’s several dozen nuclear 
weapons. 
While Americans deplore the 
assassination and resulting violence 
and desire movement toward a more 
democratic society, it is my assessment 
that we cannot afford to turn away from 
Pakistan. We must—for our own national 
interests—maintain our influence there 
by supporting whatever government 
emerges from the recent elections. Of 
equal importance, we must continue to 
support the Pakistani Army if we are to 
have success in neighboring Afghanistan 
and in maintaining continued stability in 
the region. Many in the West do not wish to 
accept the fact that Pakistan’s Army is the 
strongest and most enduring institution 
in the country and is the greatest source of 
internal stability; during previous periods 
of government by elected prime ministers, 
it was the Army’s decision whether or not 
to back the government that determined 
its lifespan and success. 
LTG(R) James R. Ellis graduated from 
West Point in 1962 and later received a 
master’s degree in International Relations 
from Princeton University. He commanded 
two Infantry Companies in combat—the 
first with the 82nd Airborne Division in the 
Dominican Republic during the country’s 
1965 Revolution, and the second with the 1st 
Infantry Division in Vietnam. He also served 
a year in Vietnam as an Advisor. His General 
Officer assignments included two years as 
U.S. Defense Representative to Pakistan, 
Commanding General of the 10th Mountain 
Division, Deputy Commander-in-Chief 
of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), 
and Commanding General of Third Army 
(Patton’s Own), the Army component of 
CENTCOM. In these last two assignments, he 
made many visits to East Africa, the Middle 
East and South Asia and had extensive 
contact with political and military leaders.
* * *
Recent Highlights in 
Terrorist Activity
February 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Three Afghan government soldiers were 
killed after a bomb exploded next to their 
convoy in Musa Qala district, Helmand 
Province. One of the convoy’s vehicles 
was destroyed during the explosion. 
– AFP, February 13
February 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
An Italian soldier was killed by Taliban 
gunfire in Sarobi district, Paktika 
Province. A Taliban spokesman claimed 
credit for the attack. – AFP, February 13
February 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Coalition forces killed at least four 
suspected Taliban fighters in Uruzgan 
Province. A handful of Taliban fighters 
were also detained during the operation. 
– The Canadian Press, February 13
February 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Two 
people were killed when an 8-10 car 
election campaign convoy was hit by a 
roadside bomb in the Swat valley in Swat 
District, North-West Frontier Province. 
The election team was preparing for the 
February 18 general elections. – Reuters, 
February 13
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February 13, 2008 (PAKISTAN): 
Purported Baitullah Mehsud spokesman 
Maulvi Omar told Reuters that Pakistan’s 
Taliban movement would not attack the 
country’s general elections on February 
18, stating, “Our central leadership have 
decided that as we have nothing to do 
with the elections, therefore there would 
be no attacks from our people. Neither do 
we support the process of the election nor 
do we have any opposition to it and if any 
attack takes place before or on election 
day, our mujahid won’t be involved in 
it.” Omar also denied involvement in the 
disappearance of Pakistan’s ambassador 
to Kabul, Tariq Azizuddin, stating, 
“We have no links with it. We don’t 
know anything about that.” Azizuddin 
disappeared while in Pakistan’s tribal 
Khyber region on February 11. – Reuters, 
February 13
February 14, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): 
Philippine authorities claimed to have 
foiled a plot by the Abu Sayyaf Group 
and Jemaah Islamiyah to assassinate the 
country’s president,  Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo, and to bomb foreign embassies. 
– AP, February 14
 
February 14, 2008 (THAILAND): 
According to Xinhua, quoting Thailand’s 
The Nation newspaper, two men were 
killed on their way to a rubber plantation 
by suspected insurgents in Narathiwat 
Province. They were targeted by M-16 
assault rifle fire. – Xinhua, February 14
February 14, 2008 (ISRAEL): A new 
posting on Islamist web forums by the 
head of the Islamic State of Iraq, Abu 
`Umar al-Baghdadi, called for major 
attacks on Israel and suggested that Iraq 
should become a “launching pad” to take 
over Jerusalem. During the 30-minute 
audiotape, al-Baghdadi calls for “opening 
new fronts to ease the American and 
Jewish pressure off the Palestinians 
while bolstering the fronts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.” The leader also chastised 
Palestinian elements that are working 
within the state system, saying that jihad 
makes “no distinctions between the infidel 
Jews and the renegade Palestinians...
between [Israeli Prime Minister Ehud] 
Olmert and his criminals and [Palestinian 
President Mahmoud] Abbas and his gang.” 
He also criticized the Hamas leadership, 
describing them as those who “betrayed 
the nation and turned against the blood of 
the martyrs.” – AP, February 14
February 14, 2008 (GERMANY): 
Authorities arrested a German citizen 
of Pakistani descent who is suspected of 
providing financial and logistical support 
to al-Qa`ida. The suspect, identified as 
Aleem Nasir, was suspected of “making 
four trips between April 2005 and June 
2007 to Pakistan’s border region with 
Afghanistan to deliver at least $5,850 in 
cash,” according to an Associated Press 
report. The report quoted prosecutors 
in the case who stated that the suspect 
also brought “binoculars, night-vision 
goggles and radios—to al-Qaida members 
in positions of responsibility.” It is also 
alleged that the suspect recruited into 
al-Qa`ida another individual living in 
Germany. – AP, February 16
February 15, 2008 (IRAQ): Two suicide 
bombers targeted Shi`a worshippers, 
killing at least three, in Tal Afar, Ninawa 
Province. The attack targeted worshippers 
at the Shaykh Juwad mosque. – AP, 
February 15
February 16, 2008 (IRAQ): Sabah al-
Janabi, the leader of an anti-al-Qa`ida 
Awakening Council in Juruf Sakher 
village near Hilla, said that 100 members 
of his anti-al-Qa`ida group have handed 
in their resignations to the U.S. military. 
The reason, according to al-Janabi, is 
due to “organized assassinations by the 
coalition forces.” Speaking about an 
incident earlier in the day in which he 
claimed three of his Awakening Council 
members were killed by gunfire from a 
U.S. helicopter, “It was the third incident 
in a month. We have lost 19 men while 
12 have been injured because of coalition 
attacks.” – AFP, February 17
February 16, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide 
car bomber rammed his explosives-laden 
vehicle into an election office, killing at 
least 37 people in Kurram Agency in the 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas. 
According to initial reports, most of the 
victims are from the Pakistan People’s 
Party. – AP, February 16
February 17, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Approximately 80 people were killed after 
a suicide bomber detonated his payload 
in the middle of an outdoor dog fighting 
competition on the outskirts of Kandahar. 
Authorities believe that the target of the 
attack may have been Abdul Hakim Jan, 
a local anti-Taliban militia leader. He was 
killed in the attack. – AP, February 17
February 17, 2008 (IRAQ): Three people 
were killed after a female suicide bomber 
detonated her explosives vest while being 
pursued by security forces in Baghdad’s 
Karrada district. – Reuters, February 17
February 17, 2008 (IRAQ): A car bomb 
detonated in Mosul, killing one policeman 
who was examining the vehicle. The bomb 
was exploded remotely. – AP, February 17
February 18, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): An 
estimated 35 civilians were killed after a 
suicide car bomber targeted a convoy of 
Canadian armored vehicles patrolling the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area. Four 
Canadian soldiers were injured during 
the attack. – National Post, February 19
February 18, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Speaking in Brussels, NATO military 
commander General John Craddock 
warned that the Taliban will likely reduce 
the number of conventional attacks due 
to persistent failure and instead increase 
the number of “irregular, asymmetric” 
attacks, such as suicide bombings and 
other “sensational” operations. – Financial 
Times, February 20
February 18, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
NATO and Afghan forces killed two 
regional Taliban commanders in Helmand 
Province. The commanders were identified 
as Mullah Abdul Matin and Mullah Karim 
Agha, and it is believed that the two were 
responsible for several suicide bombings 
in the province. – AP, February 21
February 19, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
A car bomb was remotely detonated in 
Kandahar, killing one civilian. Authorities 
believe that the missed targets were two 
Afghan National Police trucks that passed 
by the explosives-laden vehicle. – National 
Post, February 19
February 19, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The 
Philippine military announced that they 
have discovered the body of who they 
believe is top Jemaah Islamiyah bomb 
expert Dulmatin, who is suspected of 
involvement in the 2002 Bali bombings. 
The body was discovered in a shallow 
grave on Tawi-Tawi Island, and the FBI 
is involved in testing DNA from the body 
to confirm whether it is Dulmatin. – AFP, 
February 19
February 19, 2008 (IRAQ): The American 
Forces Press Service announced that the 
U.S. military will soon launch Operation 
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Marne Grand Slam, aimed at attacking 
leftover al-Qa`ida remnants southeast 
of Baghdad. According to a UPI report, 
“The operation specifically involves 
clearing a peninsula that stretches into 
the Tigris River south of Salman Pak and 
then increasing U.S. troop presence in 
the surrounding area to support the local 
population.” – UPI, February 19
February 19, 2008 (IRAQ): U.S. soldiers 
detained six suspected al-Qa`ida affiliated 
fighters in Baghdad and Samarra. One of 
the detainees is believed to have helped 
senior al-Qa`ida leaders travel through 
Baghdad. – AP, February 19
February 19, 2008 (IRAQ): Suspected al-
Qa`ida fighters killed a family that was 
involved in resisting al-Qa`ida’s presence 
in Ba`quba. According to authorities, 
“They killed the 60-year-old man, his 
wife, their son Mustafa, 18, and a 35-year-
old neighbor” after entering their home. It 
is believed that the family recently joined 
an Awakening Council. – AFP, February 20
February 19, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi soldiers 
killed two Saudis and one Algerian 
suspected of al-Qa`ida involvement. The 
raid came after information was gathered 
during an interrogation of a local al-Qa`ida 
leader. The information led authorities to 
an al-Qa`ida hideout in Samarra, where 
the Algerian and Saudis were discovered. 
– AFP, February 20
February 19, 2008 (KYRGYZSTAN): The 
Kyrgyz government announced that it 
had discovered and apprehended a group 
of al-Qa`ida operatives operating in the 
country. The last of the suspects was 
detained on February 15, according to 
reports. – Reuters, February 19
February 20, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. 
military announced that it doubted reports 
that the two women suicide bombers 
that struck Baghdad in February had 
Down syndrome. The women, however, 
had sought psychiatric treatment, but 
it is unclear what their conditions were. 
– Washington Post, February 21
 
February 20, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide 
bomber detonated his explosives in a 
market in Muqdadiya, 30 miles northeast 
of Ba`quba. Approximately 10 people 
were killed in the blast. – AFP, February 20
February 20, 2008 (IRAQ): One woman 
was killed after a suicide car bomber 
detonated his explosives in Tal Afar, 
Ninawa Province. – AFP, February 20
February 20, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. 
military released a report stating that 
three individuals suspected of being 
leaders in al-Qa`ida in Iraq were killed 
or captured recently. One of the men was 
identified as “Abu Karrar,” who military 
authorities suspect is one of al-Qa`ida’s 
leaders for operations in Baghdad and 
Diyala Province. – UPI, February 20
February 20, 2008 (MOROCCO): 
According to Morocco’s official news 
agency, authorities recently foiled an 
Islamist terrorist plot to kill Jews, cabinet 
ministers and army officers in the country. 
The cell, which was in possession of a 
large amount of weapons, allegedly raised 
funds through petty crime and robbery in 
Europe. More than 30 people have been 
arrested in connection with the cell, and 
authorities allege that the group had links 
to al-Qa`ida. – AP, February 21
February 20-21, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Afghan authorities neutralized a terrorist 
cell in Kandahar Province by arresting 
10 of its members. It is believed that the 
cell was responsible for a series of recent 
bombings in the province that have 
killed more than 100 people. The arrests 
occurred in Kandahar city and Arghandab 
district. – AP, February 21
February 21, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): The 
Philippine military is trying to confirm 
reports that top Jemaah Islamiyah 
operative Umar Patek was wounded 
during a gun battle with government 
troops on Tawi-Tawi on January 31. It is 
the same gun battle that the government 
believes killed Dulmatin, another top JI 
operative. Authorities, in conjunction 
with the FBI, are still determining whether 
the body discovered is indeed Dulmatin. 
– Philippine Star, February 21
February 22, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide 
bomber killed at least four people after 
detonating his explosives at the entrance 
of the al-Rahman mosque in Falluja, 
Anbar Province. – Gulf News, February 23
February 22, 2008 (IRAQ): Three civilians 
were killed after a bomb, concealed 
under a horse-drawn cart, was remotely-
detonated in Baghdad. – AP, February 22
February 22, 2008 (IRAQ): Two policemen 
were killed after an explosives-laden car 
exploded in Tikrit. The seemingly disabled 
vehicle was in the process of being towed 
into the local police headquarters when 
the booby-trapped car exploded. – AP, 
February 22
February 22, 2008 (THAILAND): Lukman 
B. Lima, the leader of the separatist Pattani 
United Liberation Organization, warned 
the Thai government that failure to grant 
autonomy to the provinces of Pattani, 
Narathiwat and Yala would result in an 
escalation of the insurgency. Lukman is 
in exile in Sweden. – AP, February 22
February 22, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
suicide car bomber attacked an Afghan 
army patrol in Khost Province. There 
were no casualties other than the death of 
the assailant. – AP, February 22
February 22, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A 
roadside bomb killed at least 13 people in 
Swat Valley in the North-West Frontier 
Province. Those killed were wedding 
guests, and the dead included the bride, 
her father and several children. – Voice of 
America, February 22
February 23, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Two 
paramilitary soldiers and one policeman 
were killed after Islamist militants 
attacked a government checkpoint near 
Peshawar. – AP, February 24
February 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Seven Afghan guards were killed after 
the vehicle in which they were traveling 
hit a landmine in Kunar Province. The 
guards were providing security to a road 
construction company. – AFP, February 23
February 23, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
suicide bomber detonated his explosives 
next to a police vehicle in Farah Province, 
although there were no fatal casualties 
other than the bomber. – AFP, February 23
February 23, 2008 (YEMEN): Jaber al-
Banna, a Yemeni-American and one of 
the FBI’s 26 most wanted terrorists, 
“appeared at a session of his trial in a 
Yemeni court Saturday with bodyguards 
and then walked free, apparently not 
subject to any form of incarceration,” 
according to the Associated Press. The 
trial charged al-Banna and 22 other al-
Qa`ida members for involvement in 
attacks on oil facilities. Al-Banna is one 
of the 22 al-Qa`ida prisoners who escaped 
from jail in Yemen in February 2006, only 
to later surrender to authorities. He was 
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not, however, sent back to jail after his 
surrender. The United States is offering 
a $5 million reward for his arrest. – AP, 
February 23
February 23, 2008 (IRAQ): Suicide 
bombers killed one of the senior leaders 
of an Awakening Council in Falluja, 
Shaykh Ibrahim Mutayri al-Mohammedi. 
The shaykh was killed in his home in an 
operation that allegedly involved five 
members of al-Qa`ida in Iraq, all of whom 
were killed in the explosion. – BBC News, 
February 24
February 24, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Maulvi 
Omar, the spokesman for Tehrik-i-
Taliban, told reporters that the Taliban 
movement in Pakistan is “looking for 
dialogue with those who got elected” in 
the country’s recent elections. Omar, 
however, also said, “We want peace, but if 
they impose war on us, we will not spare 
them…We don’t want political parties 
to repeat the mistake which Musharraf 
committed and follow a path dictated by 
the U.S.” – AP, February 24
February 24, 2008 (IRAQ): At least 50 
people were killed after a suicide bomber 
detonated his explosives among a large 
group of Shi`a pilgrims in Iskandariyya. 
The explosion occurred when the group 
was gathered in a refreshments tent while 
on their way to Karbala to celebrate the 
annual Arbain festival. – Reuters, February 
24; AP, February 25
February 24, 2008 (IRAQ): Three Shi`a 
pilgrims were killed after being attacked 
by gunmen in Dora, a predominately 
Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad. – AP, 
February 24
February 24, 2008 (YEMEN): Yemeni 
authorities announced that they foiled 
an attack on a crude oil pipeline in Marib 
Province and arrested a number of the 
alleged perpetrators. – Reuters, February 24
February 24, 2008 (MAURITANIA): A 
Mauritanian judge announced that five 
Mauritanians and two Tunisians have 
been charged for involvement in the 
February 2 attack on the Israeli Embassy 
in the country. It appears that the men 
are not yet in custody, although the 
judge expects their arrests shortly. – AP, 
February 24
February 25, 2008 (TANZANIA): 
Police in Tanzania are in the process of 
interrogating nine suspects who allegedly 
planned to bomb various locations during 
the recent visit of President George W. 
Bush. The arrests, which occurred in 
Dar es Salaam and Arusha, included one 
suspect who authorities are certain was 
involved in the Paradise Hotel attack in 
Mombasa, Kenya in 2002. In total, five 
of the suspects are Tanzanian nationals, 
while three are Arabs and one Asian. 
Authorities did not clarify the exact date 
of the arrests. – The East African, February 25
February 25, 2008 (IRAQ): Three 
National Police officers were killed and 
nine wounded after a suicide bomber in 
a wheelchair detonated his explosives at 
a police station in Samarra. According to 
press reports, the bomber had arranged 
a meeting between himself and Brig. 
Gen. Abdul Jabbar Rabei Muttar. When 
Muttar went to greet the wheelchair-
confined bomber, he detonated his 
explosives which were concealed under 
the wheelchair seat. General Muttar was 
among the dead. – CNN, February 25
February 25, 2008 (IRAQ): Four Shi`a 
pilgrims were killed by a roadside bomb 
south of Baghdad. – AP, February 25 
February 25, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): 
Philippine marines killed an Islamic 
militant in the remote Tipo-Tipo town 
on Basilan Island. The firefight occurred 
after the marines encountered a group of 
suspected Abu Sayyaf Group militants 
while on patrol. – Philippine Inquirer, February 
26; philstar.com, February 26
February 25, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
The Taliban released a statement warning 
the four cell phone companies that 
operate in Afghanistan to cease operating 
every night between 5 PM and 7 AM. The 
Taliban stated that NATO and U.S. forces 
were tracking the movement and location 
of their fighters through cell phone 
signals, in addition to intercepting their 
cellular transmissions. If the companies 
fail to cease operations between the time 
period specified, the statement warns 
that the Taliban will target “their offices, 
suboffices and tower stations.” – New York 
Times, February 26
February 25, 2008 (SOMALIA): Somalia’s 
Youth Mujahidin Movement (YMM) 
released an internet statement claiming 
to have captured a strategic town 15 
miles south of Baidoa. The statement 
claims that the YMM attacked the Dinsor 
military base in Bay Province, and in the 
ensuing fight 300 government soldiers 
allegedly fled their positions. According 
to the statement, “We have driven out the 
apostate soldiers and have acquired many 
weapons, including four armored military 
vehicles.” – AKI, February 25
February 25, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Surgeon 
General Lieutenant General Mushtaq Baig 
was assassinated by a suicide bomber in 
Rawalpindi, the highest-ranking officer 
to be killed in Pakistan’s fight against 
Islamist militants that largely began 
almost two years ago. The attack occurred 
as the general’s vehicle was stopped in 
traffic on his way home from his office. 
Seven others were killed in the attack, 
including Baig’s bodyguard and driver. 
Witnesses report that the suicide bomber 
ran up to the vehicle pretending to be a 
beggar. – guardian.co.uk, February 25
February 25, 2008 (PAKISTAN): 
Pakistani authorities arrested Qari 
Saifullah Akhtar on the suspicion that 
he was involved in an October suicide 
bombing attack on Benazir Bhutto and 
her supporters, although the attack failed 
to kill Bhutto; she was later assassinated 
in a separate suicide bombing on 
December 27. Authorities stated that 
Bhutto named Qari Saifullah Akhtar as a 
suspect in the October attack before her 
death. It is believed that Akhtar used to 
run al-Qa`ida’s Rishikor training camp 
in Afghanistan during the rule of the 
Taliban. – AP, February 26
February 25, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Police 
arrested four militants in Lahore who 
were suspected of plotting terrorist 
attacks on foreign missions. The men 
are allegedly members of Lashkar-e-
Jhangvi, an al-Qa`ida-linked militant 
group. Authorities claimed that one of 
the suspects, Fahad Munir, confessed to 
involvement in the November 1 suicide 
bombing on a bus transporting military 
personnel in Sargodha, which left eight 
people dead. – AP, February 26
February 25, 2008 (PAKISTAN): 
Approximately 12 militants attacked 
the offices of the non-governmental 
organization Plan, an aid group that 
works with local communities to offer 
education and other benefits to children. 
The attack, which occurred in the North-
West Frontier Province, left three staff 
members dead. – CNN, February 25
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February 26, 2008 (ALGERIA): Algerian 
security forces killed an al-Qa`ida in the 
Islamic Maghreb leader in Legatha, which 
is 40 miles east of Algiers. The leader, 
who was identified by the alias “Abdi 
Abdi,” was suspected of involvement in 
the September 12, 2006 bomb attacks on 
police stations in Dergana and Reghaia, in 
addition to a June 2007 attack in Reghaia 
that left two police officers dead. – AP, 
February 27
February 26, 2008 (ISRAEL): Major 
General Amos Yadlin told the Knesset’s 
Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee 
that al-Qa`ida operatives had slipped 
into the Gaza Strip during the January 23 
border breaching incident on the Egyptian 
border. – Jerusalem Post, February 26
February 26, 2008 (IRAQ): At least 
eight people were killed after a suicide 
bomber exploded on a bus near Mosul in 
Ninawa Province. There are conflicting 
reports, however, as one account stated 
that the bomber detonated his explosives 
after being confronted by a soldier who 
had boarded the bus at a checkpoint. 
– Reuters, February 26
February 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
Five policemen were killed after a bomb 
destroyed their vehicle in Khost Province. 
– AFP, February 26
February 26, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
suicide bomber attempted to kill coalition 
forces in Kandahar, but his explosives 
detonated prematurely after he was hit by 
coalition gunfire. – AFP, February 26
February 26, 2008 (UNITED STATES): 
The Pentagon announced that charges 
against Ali Hamza Ahmad Sulayman 
al-Bahlul, who is accused of creating 
propaganda videos for al-Qa`ida and 
assisting Usama bin Ladin, have been 
finalized. The Yemeni faces a military 
trial at the Guantanamo Bay naval base. 
A trial date, however, has not been set. 
– AP, February 27
February 26, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): 
Mohammed Hamid, who refers to himself 
as “Usama bin London,” was convicted 
of operating terrorist training camps in 
England and of recruiting Muslims to 
attend the camps. One of the men who 
attempted to bomb London’s public 
transportation system on July 21, 2005 had 
attended one of the camps. – Washington 
Post, February 27
February 26, 2008 (TUNISIA): A 
Tunisian court sentenced 17 men to prison 
terms ranging from 2-12 years for creating 
a terrorist cell with links to al-Qa`ida in 
the Islamic Maghreb. The men were all 
arrested in 2006. – Reuters, February 27
February 27, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. 
military killed two Saudi al-Qa`ida 
militants in Mosul, one of which, Abu 
Yasir al-Saudi, was believed to have been 
behind the deaths of five U.S. soldiers on 
January 28. The two foreign fighters were 
hit by a helicopter precision missile strike 
as they were driving in the city. – AP, 
March 2
February 27, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
six-hour gunfight erupted in Helmand 
Province after Taliban militants 
engaged a government team that was 
destroying opium crops in Marja 
district. According to the provincial 
police chief, approximately 25 Taliban 
fighters were killed during the battle, 
including a Taliban commander known 
as Mullah Naqeebullah. – AFP, February 
28
February 27, 2008 (THAILAND): A 
Thai soldier was killed after his patrol 
vehicle was hit by a roadside bomb in 
Krongpinang district of Yala Province. 
– Bangkok Post, February 27
February 27, 2008 (SINGAPORE): Mas 
Selamat bin Kastari, a leading operative 
of Jemaah Islamiyah, escaped from a 
police detention facility in Singapore. 
Kastari was arrested by Indonesian 
police on that country’s island of Bintan 
in January 2006, and custody was given 
to Singapore, where he has been detained 
ever since. Kastari was the leader of the 
Singaporean wing of JI. – Reuters, February 
28
February 28, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A house 
in Kaloosha village of South Waziristan 
Agency was destroyed by a missile, killing 
approximately 10 suspected Islamist 
militants, some of whom were believed 
Arab in origin. Press reports speculated 
that the missile was possibly fired from a 
U.S. Predator drone and that the targets 
were connected to al-Qa`ida. – Reuters, 
February 28
February 28, 2008 (UNITED STATES): 
The U.S. Treasury Department announced 
that it had placed economic sanctions 
on four individuals—Badran Turki 
Hishan al-Mazidih, Ghazy Fezza Hishan 
al-Mazidih, Akram Turki Hishan al-
Mazidih and Saddah Jaylut al-Marsumi—
who are accused of facilitating the flow 
of weapons, money, terrorist operatives 
and other materials from Syria into Iraq. 
– AP, February 28
February 28, 2008 (IRAQ): Authorities 
arrested an insurgent leader who led a 
cell that recruited women for suicide 
bomb operations. According to the U.S. 
military, “The ringleader was a man trying 
to recruit women to carry out SVEST 
(suicide vest) bombings. The cell leader 
used his wife and another woman, to act 
as carriers of his next SVEST attack.” The 
arrest occurred near the town of Kan Bani 
Sad in Diyala Province. – AP, March 1
February 29, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A 
suicide bomber detonated his explosives 
during a funeral for a slain police officer, 
killing at least 50 people in Mingora 
of Swat District, North-West Frontier 
Province. – Chicago Tribune, March 4
February 29, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): 
National police chief Director General 
Avelino Razon told reporters that 
authorities had arrested three days 
earlier a foreigner involved in a plot to 
assassinate President Gloria Macapagal 
Arroyo and bomb foreign embassies in the 
country. Little information was revealed 
about the suspect, except that he has 
links to Jemaah Islamiyah and al-Qa`ida. 
The foiled terrorist plot was first revealed 
by authorities on February 14. – The Age, 
February 29
March 1, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): A bomb 
exploded at a bar near a Philippine 
military camp on Jolo Island. U.S. troops 
involved in the country’s counter-
terrorism mission were present at the 
camp at the time of the explosion. Two 
Filipino soldiers were injured, along with 
four female bar employees. – AP, March 2
March 2, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide 
bomber killed at least 39 people on the 
outskirts of Peshawar during a meeting of 
tribal leaders. The leaders were attending 
a jirga with the intent to form a “committee 
of locals” to oppose anti-government 
militants. – Reuters, March 2
March 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
According to local officials in Helmand 
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Province, gunmen destroyed a cell phone 
tower in Sangin district. The attack was 
the third of its kind since a February 25 
Taliban statement warning four cell phone 
companies that operate in Afghanistan to 
cease operating every night between 5 PM 
and 7 AM. – RFE/RL, March 3
March 2, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
Canadian soldier was killed after a convoy 
bringing supplies to an Afghan army 
outpost was hit by a roadside bomb. The 
attack occurred near an area known as 
Mushan, 28 miles southwest of Kandahar 
city. – Globe and Mail, March 3
March 2, 2008 (IRAQ): The U.S. military 
announced that a car bomb killed at least 
four people in Samarra, including one 
child. – AP, March 3
March 2, 2008 (IRAQ): A combined U.S.-
Iraqi military operation targeted an al-
Qa`ida in Iraq cell that was involved with 
assassinations and bomb attacks in Ninawa 
Province. The operation resulted in the 
killings of nine suspected insurgents, and 
the capture of eight others.  – AP, March 6; 
The Canadian Press, March 6
March 2, 2008 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida 
released a new video eulogy for their 
slain operative Abu Laith al-Libi, who 
was killed by a U.S. Predator drone in 
Pakistan in late January. The new video, 
which was posted on jihadist web forums, 
displays the deceased body of al-Libi. 
– AP, March 2
March 2, 2008 (GLOBAL): A new book 
by al-Qa`ida second-in-command Ayman 
al-Zawahiri appeared on Islamist internet 
forums. In the 215-page book, Zawahiri 
attacks the “revisions” of a number of 
former radical Islamist leaders who have 
spoken publicly against certain al-Qa`ida 
tactics, especially suicide bombings 
and attacks that kill large numbers of 
civilians. In the book, titled Exonerations, 
Zawahiri says that “this message that I 
present to the reader today is the most 
difficult, if not the hardest I have written 
in my life,” and argues that former jihadist 
ideologues who have come out publicly 
against al-Qa`ida’s violent tactics are 
serving “the interests of the Crusader-
Zionist alliance with the Arab leaders to 
drug the mujahidin and drag them away 
from the confrontation.” – AP, March 3
March 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Taliban 
fighters attacked a NATO and Afghan 
military compound in Sabri district, 
Khost Province. During the attack, the 
fighters fired on soldiers guarding the 
compound, and then drove a truck bomb 
into the compound, detonating it inside. 
The number of casualties were not 
immediately reported. – Reuters, March 3
March 3, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): Two 
NATO soldiers and two Afghan civilians 
were killed after a suicide car bomber 
targeted a government building in Yaqoubi 
district, Khost Province. – AP, March 4
March 3, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): The 
Saudi Arabian government announced 
that 28 al-Qa`ida suspects were recently 
apprehended under suspicion of planning 
to launch a “terrorist campaign” inside 
the country. The group was part of the 
same plot that involved an earlier set of 
28 arrests in December. According to 
the Interior Ministry, there are now 56 
suspected individuals part of the plot, 
and some of them were in direct contact 
with al-Qa`ida’s senior leadership, 
including Ayman al-Zawahiri. According 
to the ministry, “They were instructed 
to rebuild the deviant organization and 
launch a terrorist campaign inside Saudi 
Arabia. Preparations for these criminal 
plans had reached advanced stages.” 
– AFP, March 3
March 3, 2008 (INDONESIA): Abu Dujana, 
one of the top Jemaah Islamiyah leaders in 
custody, told a court that he was involved 
in procuring weapons and handling funds 
for the group. The operative said that he 
trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan in 
1989. In the 1990s, he was an instructor 
in the southern Philippines. According to 
Dujana, he became JI’s military leader in 
October 2005. – AP, March 3
March 3, 2008 (SOMALIA): The U.S. 
Navy launched at least two Tomahawk 
cruise missiles into southern Somalia in 
an attempt to kill a “known al-Qa`ida 
terrorist.” The target was Saleh Ali Saleh 
Nabhan, a Kenyan wanted by the FBI 
for suspected involvement in a terrorist 
attack on a hotel and airliner in Mombasa, 
Kenya in 2002. Furthermore, Kenyan 
authorities allege that Nabhan was 
also involved in the 1998 U.S. Embassy 
bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. 
It is not believed that he was killed in the 
strike. – New York Times, March 4
March 3, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car 
bomber killed at least 21 people in 
Baghdad’s Bab al-Mudham neighborhood. 
Reports state that the assailant targeted a 
neighborhood watch group’s checkpoint. 
– AP, March 3
March 3, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber 
tried to drive an explosives-laden minibus 
into the headquarters of the Interior 
Ministry’s 4th Brigade in Baghdad’s 
eastern Zayouna neighborhood. Iraqi 
security forces, however, managed to 
prevent the vehicle from entering the 
compound, although the vehicle still 
exploded and killed at least two Iraqi 
soldiers. – AP, March 3
March 3, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi police 
announced that three officers were killed 
after a car bomb exploded in Shikaat, a 
town north of Baghdad. – AP, March 3
March 4, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): One 
policeman was killed in Tani district of 
Khost Province after a suicide car bomber 
attempted to destroy a government 
building. The explosion was detonated 
prematurely after Afghan guards fired 
at the vehicle as it was approaching its 
target. – AP, March 4
March 4, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): According 
to the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in 
conjunction with a press report quoting 
intelligence authorities and local officials, 
a Jordanian Jemaah Islamiyah operative 
is training Abu Sayyaf Group members 
in bomb-making and sabotage techniques 
in Basilan. The operative was named as 
Pidas Mohammad. – Philippine Star, March 4
March 4, 2008 (PAKISTAN): At least 
four people were killed after two suicide 
bombers attacked a naval war college 
in Lahore. According to an individual 
interviewed by the New York Times, “One 
suicide bomber was stationed outside the 
rear gate of the college…[he] exploded 
himself, probably to make way for the 
second attacker. The gate was destroyed 
as a result of the explosion. A naval vehicle 
was entering into the college at that time, 
and under that cover, the second bomber 
on a motorbike tried to enter the premises. 
He was challenged and he exploded 
himself near the transport shed, next to 
the gate.” – New York Times, March 5
March 5, 2008 (UNITED STATES): 
Former U.S. Navy sailor Hassan Abu-
Jihaad was convicted by a jury of 
providing material support to terrorists 
and disclosing classified information. 
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Abu-Jihaad, a U.S.-born citizen, is a 
Muslim convert who was previously 
known as Paul R. Hall. He could face 25 
years in prison and will be sentenced on 
May 23. – CNN, March 5
March 5, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
CENTCOM commander Admiral William 
Fallon told the U.S. House Armed Services 
Committee that he does not expect the 
Taliban to launch a spring offensive this 
year. – AP, March 5
March 5, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A Pakistani 
court sentenced al-Qa`ida-linked militant 
Anwarul Haq to death for his role in a 
2006 suicide attack that left U.S. diplomat 
David Foy, and three other people, dead. 
The attack occurred on March 2, 2006 
outside the U.S. Consulate in Karachi. 
– AFP, March 5
March 5, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Taliban 
militants attacked another telecom tower 
in Afghanistan, making it the fourth attack 
on a cell phone tower since late February. 
The attack occurred in southern Zabul 
Province. – Reuters, March 6
March 6, 2008 (IRAQ): Two bombs 
ripped through a busy Baghdad shopping 
district, killing approximately 68 people. 
The attack occurred in the primarily Shi`a, 
middle class Karrada neighborhood. – AP, 
March 7
March 6, 2008 (PHILIPPINES): Philippine 
authorities announced the arrests of two 
Arab militants who were plotting to bomb 
the embassies of the United States, Israel 
and the United Kingdom in Manila. The 
men were arrested last month during 
raids on the island of Mindanao. – Reuters, 
March 6
March 6, 2008 (ISRAEL): A single 
Palestinian gunman opened fire at the 
Mercaz Harav religious seminary in 
Jerusalem, killing eight people. All 
of the dead were rabbinical students. 
– Bloomberg, March 6
March 7, 2008 (IRAQ): A car bomb 
exploded outside a Mosul police station, 
killing at least two Iraqi police officers 
and one civilian. – AP, March 7
March 8, 2008 (SAUDI ARABIA): Saudi 
Arabia’s top religious authority, Grand 
Mufti `Abd al-`Aziz al-Shaykh, warned 
Saudis against providing financial support 
to “evil” groups, a likely reference to al-
Qa`ida. According to the shaykh, “It is 
bad to give funds to just anyone who asks, 
and to parties with shabby reputations 
or unknown backing. It’s even worse to 
give it to an organization that’s known 
for its evil and for hurting Islam and its 
followers.” – AP, March 8
March 9, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): 
According to media reports, “four British 
police officers are under surveillance 
after being identified as possible al-
Qa`ida spies…” It is believed that the 
operatives joined the police department 
to monitor potential terrorism raids by 
London’s Metropolitan Police. MI5 and 
investigators are watching the suspects in 
order to build up an effective case against 
them, and they have not yet been arrested. 
– Fox News, March 9
March 9, 2008 (YEMEN): Jaber al-Banna, 
a Yemeni-American and one of the FBI’s 
26 most wanted terrorists, was granted 
bail on his own recognizance and was free 
to leave the court. Al-Banna previously 
appeared in court on February 23 and was 
not subject to any form of incarceration at 
that time either. – AFP, March 9
March 10, 2008 (GLOBAL): Top al-Qa`ida 
operative Abu Yahia al-Libi appeared 
in a new video posted on Islamist web 
forums. In the video, al-Libi claims that 
the recent revisions by Sayyid Imam, the 
former mufti of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, 
was a forgery created by the Egyptian 
security apparatus, which is the “master 
of deception.” Al-Libi asked, “If the 
document really reflects its author’s 
belief, then why is the security apparatus 
keeping him behind bars?” - AP, March 11
March 10, 2008 (PHILIPPINES/
INDONESIA): According to the Associated 
Press,  “Philippine and Indonesian police 
are planning to set up a DNA databank 
to help rapidly identify captured or slain 
members of the al-Qaida-linked militant 
group Jemaah Islamiyah.” The proposed 
system would involve Interpol. – AP, 
March 10
March 10, 2008 (IRAQ): A female suicide 
bomber killed Thaer Saggban al-Karkhi, 
a prominent Sunni Arab tribal leader 
who led a neighborhood security group 
in Kanaan, Diyala Province. The bomber 
knocked on the door of the chief’s home, 
and then detonated her explosives when 
he came to the door. In addition to al-
Karkhi’s death, three others were killed 
including the chief’s niece. – Reuters, March 
10
March 10, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car 
bomber targeted a hotel popular with 
foreigners and government officials 
in Sulaymaniyah Province. The 
Sulaymaniyah Palace Hotel was damaged 
in the blast, and at least one person was 
killed. – Reuters, March 10
March 10, 2008 (IRAQ): Five U.S. soldiers 
were killed after a suicide bomber targeted 
their foot patrol in Mansour district of 
Baghdad. – Reuters, March 10
March 10, 2008 (IRAQ): Three U.S. 
soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb 
north of Baghdad. – AP, March 11
March 10, 2008 (TUNISIA): Al-Qa`ida in 
the Islamic Maghreb released a statement 
that claimed credit for the kidnappings of 
two Austrian tourists who disappeared 
from Tunisia in February. According to 
the statement, the tourists were abducted 
on February 22 and were seized in 
response to the West’s support for Israel. 
According to al-Jazira, “The spokesman 
said in the tape that the group will 
announce its conditions for the release 
of the two tourists at a later stage.” – BBC 
News, March 10
March 11, 2008 (UNITED KINGDOM): 
A British court sentenced Khalid Khaliq 
to 16 months in jail for possessing an al-
Qa`ida training manual. Khaliq was in 
personal contact with some of the July 7 
London bombers. – BBC News, March 11
March 11, 2008 (IRAQ): A bus traveling 
from Najaf to Basra was hit by a roadside 
bomb, killing at least 16 civilians. – AP, 
March 11
March 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): Two 
suicide car bombers drove an explosives-
laden vehicle into Pakistan’s Federal 
Investigation Agency in Lahore, killing 
approximately 17 people and largely 
destroying the building. – CNN, March 11
March 11, 2008 (PAKISTAN): A suicide 
bomber drove a van into a house in an 
area of Lahore known as Model Town, 
killing three people. – CNN, March 11
March 11, 2008 (THAILAND): Suspected 
insurgents killed a local official in Saiburi 
district of Pattani Province. – TNA, March 
11
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March 11, 2008 (SOMALIA): A roadside 
bomb partially destroyed a Central Bank of 
Somalia vehicle, in southern Mogadishu, 
killing two police officers. – AFP, March 11
March 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
suicide car bomber targeted a NATO-
led convoy in Kandahar, but failed to 
cause casualties among the troops. One 
civilian, however, was killed in the attack. 
- Reuters, March 12
March 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
roadside bomb blew up next to a vehicle 
containing Romanian ISAF troops on 
a road between Kandahar and Zabul 
Province. Three of the soldiers were 
wounded. - AFP, March 12
March 12, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): 
According to Nimroz Governor Ghulam 
Dastagir Azad, Afghan and coalition 
forces killed 41 Taliban militants who were 
traveling through Helmand Province. 
- The Press Association, March 13
March 12, 2008 (JORDAN): The Jordanian 
government freed Isam Mohammed Taher 
al-Barqawi (also known as Shaykh Abu 
Muhammad al-Maqdisi) after being in 
police custody since 2005. Al-Maqdisi 
is considered a mentor to now deceased 
al-Qa`ida in Iraq leader Abu Mus`ab al-
Zarqawi. Zarqawi and al-Maqdisi shared 
a cell block between 1995 and 1999. - AP, 
March 12
March 13, 2008 (NORTH AFRICA): A 
statement by al-Qa`ida in the Islamic 
Maghreb was posted on an Islamist 
website, and the group declared that 
it would free two abducted Austrian 
tourists if all of AQIM’s jailed operatives 
were released in Tunisia and Algeria. The 
statement also included six photographs 
of the two hostages as proofs of life. It 
is believed that the two tourists were 
kidnapped on February 22. - AP, March 
13
March 13, 2008 (AFGHANISTAN): A 
suicide car bomber attacked a U.S. troop 
convoy in Kabul, damaging two armored 
vehicles. Although no coalition troops 
were killed in the attack, at least six 
civilians died in the blast. The Taliban 
claimed responsibility. - Voice of America, 
March 13
March 13, 2008 (IRAQ): Iraqi authorities 
announced that alleged al-Qa`ida 
militants attacked the Benizad village in 
Diyala Province, killing five members of 
an Awakening Council and then beheading 
them. - AFP, March 13
March 13, 2008 (IRAQ): A suicide car 
bomber killed at least 18 people in central 
Baghdad’s Bab al-Sharji area. - AFP, 
March 13
March 13, 2008 (GERMANY): Abdelali 
Miftah, a Moroccan charged for recruiting 
and smuggling fighters to al-Qa`ida in 
Iraq, appeared in court today and could 
be sentenced to five years in prison if 
convicted. Miftah was arrested in March 
2007 in Sweden. - AP, March 13
March 14, 2008 (UNITED STATES): The 
Pentagon announced that a high-level al-
Qa`ida operative, Mohammad Rahim, was 
now in U.S. custody at Guantanamo Bay. 
Rahim, who allegedly helped Usama bin 
Ladin escape from Afghanistan in 2001, 
was likely detained in the summer of 
2007, although the circumstances of his 
apprehension are not clear. - AP, March 14
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